COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN POWER
AND JUDGES’ POLITICAL SPEECH
Michael Richard Dimino, Sr.*
INTRODUCTION
Judges and judicial candidates are regularly restricted in their political
speech and association by two categories of ethical canons that have only
recently come under constitutional examination: those that restrict the ways
judges conduct their own campaigns1 and those that restrict judges’
participation in other aspects of politics, including non-judicial campaigns.
The first category includes, among other prohibitions, bans on soliciting
campaign contributions2 or making “pledges, promises or commitments” of
on-the-bench conduct, while the second includes such restrictions as taking
positions of leadership with parties,3 contributing to others’ campaigns,4 and
publicly indicating support for (or opposition to) a candidate for nonjudicial office.5 Whether any of these restrictions on political activity
survives review in future cases will depend on a judicial assessment of the
importance of the interests they serve – advancing judicial independence
and the confidence of the public in blind justice – and the weighing of those
interests against judges’ rights of free expression.6
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1
Judges in thirty-nine states, comprising eighty-seven percent of all judges in the United States, are elected.
See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 209-11 (2002); NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS, CALL TO ACTION: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION 7
(2002).
2
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(2).
3
See id. Canon 5A(1)(a).
4
See id. Canon 5A(1)(e).
5
See id. Canon 5A(1)(b).
6
Not even political speech enjoys absolute protection from regulation so long as the speech limitations
satisfy strict scrutiny by advancing a “compelling state interest” in a “narrowly tailored” fashion. See Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199-200, 206-11 (1992) (plurality opinion); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 660 (1990); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982) (allowing the possibility that restrictions on
campaign speech may be constitutional if “supported by not only a legitimate state interest, but a compelling one,
and [if] the restriction operate[s] without unnecessarily circumscribing protected expression”); EUGENE VOLOKH,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 224 (2d ed.
2005) (“[A]t least in theory even the most important kinds of speech can be restricted if the government has a
really good reason for restricting them, and enacts a law that’s sufficiently carefully crafted.”). Justice Kennedy
has argued that content-based restrictions on speech, not within traditional exceptions to First Amendment, should
be held unconstitutional without regard to compelling interests or narrow tailoring. See Republican Party v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124-28 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see also infra notes 1820 and accompanying text. Though it applied strict scrutiny, White itself did not hold that that standard, as
opposed to Justice Kennedy’s more absolutist vision of the First Amendment, must be used. Instead, it noted that
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In its first case raising a challenge to a judicial-campaign restriction,
Republican Party v. White,7 the Supreme Court held that Minnesota
violated the First Amendment8 by forbidding a judicial candidate from
“announc[ing] his . . . views on disputed legal or political issues.”9 Though
the 5-4 split in White was a familiar one, with the five most conservative
Justices in the majority and the four most liberal dissenting, that split was
unusual for free-speech cases, and suggested that the Justices were
motivated by something other than their solicitude for the place of free
expression in American society.
This Article argues that rather than reflecting differing positions on the
value of free speech, the divide between the majority and dissenting
opinions in White reflects vastly different approaches to the countermajoritarian difficulty,10 and to the Canons11 that seek to enable countermajoritarian decision-making by permitting judges the freedom to decide
cases irrespective of public pressure. The dissenters understood judicial
independence as essential to upholding the rule of law, believing that
“[e]ven when they develop common law or give concrete meaning to
constitutional text, judges act only in the context of individual cases, the
outcome of which cannot depend on the will of the public.”12 Such
independence, however, insulates not only the judges who always faithfully
seek to apply the law, but also those judges who use their unaccountability
to shape the law in favor of their own preferred policies. The White
majority, apparently suspicious of that potential outcome, sought to make
the counter-majoritarian difficulty less difficult by making the judiciary less
counter-majoritarian.
Part I begins by analyzing the arguments in White and other judicialfree-speech cases, arguing that pro-speech decisions are supported by two
different grounds: promoting democratic self-governance and encouraging
individual self-expression, while anti-speech decisions tend to focus on
neither party had challenged the use of strict scrutiny in that case. See White, 536 U.S. at 774. See also In re
Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (observing that the Supreme Court did not decide which
standard was appropriate, but apparently viewing strict scrutiny as the most speech-protective option available).
7
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
8
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First
Amendment has been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause against state
infringement, see Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 386-87 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925),
and the remainder of this Article refers to the First Amendment, even when the governmental action in question is
undertaken by a state.
9
MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000). This is known as the “announce clause.”
10
See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
11
Most states’ canons of judicial ethics are based on the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. See Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality “Might
Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000) (contending that forty-nine states have
adopted some form of the ABA Model Code). Throughout this Article I refer to state codes of judicial conduct
collectively as the “Canons” and quote from the ABA Model Code except where indicated.
12
White, 536 U.S. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Accord id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A judge]
may make common law, but judges on the merits of individual cases, not as a mandate from the voters.”).
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concerns of institutional legitimacy. Some decisions supporting free speech
in judicial elections have looked at the policy-making capability of courts,
and have reasoned that the people are entitled to affect the course of
judicially made policy in states where judges are elected. Others may be
considered more straightforward applications of traditional First
Amendment principles under an individual-rights paradigm (as opposed to
an approach under which the courts broadly oversee the democratic
process), reasoning that because the speech at issue is political, and the
restriction is a content-based law designed to discourage the political
speech, the regulation must fail.
In Part II, I examine the Justices’ voting patterns, discovering that the
votes in White are unusual in light of the Justices’ past behavior in freespeech cases. I then analyze other potential explanations for the Justices’
votes in White, and suggest that their views on criminal procedure and
judicial power may color their views on judicial free speech.
Part III discusses the restrictions states place on the political activity of
their judges, both as to the ways elected judges may conduct their own
campaigns and the ways judges may involve themselves in political parties
or other candidates’ campaigns. I analyze the interests supporting the
restrictions and the restraint placed on free expression by each type of
regulation, concluding that while restrictions on the conduct of judicial
campaigns are largely in place – and criticized – because the writers and
enforcers of the Canons do not want the judiciary influenced by public
opinion, restrictions on judicial participation in non-judicial campaigns
promote the appearance of an apolitical judiciary so as to increase courts’
legitimacy and power. Despite this apparent difference, however, both
types of restrictions maximize the courts’ capacity to issue countermajoritarian decisions – one by discouraging the public from seeing law as
a series of policy choices and the other by limiting the chance of electoral
defeat as reprimand for judges who make choices with which the voters
disagree. I argue that White struck down the announce clause because it
facilitated counter-majoritarian judicial policy-making – a result the Justices
in the White majority found troublesome. The dissenters, far more
accepting of independent judicial policy-making, voted to uphold the clause
for the same reason.
Part IV explores the implications, both in terms of White’s realism and
the hypothesized link between counter-majoritarian power and judicial free
speech, for cases challenging restrictions on judicial involvement in nonjudicial politics. White reveals four potential paths the Court could take as
new cases are argued and new Justices are appointed, ranging from Justice
Kennedy’s protection of “unabridged speech [a]s the foundation of political
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freedom,”13 to Justice Scalia’s protection of speech to promote democratic
self-governance, to Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg’s refusal to protect
speech when it would impair judicial power. The future of judicial free
speech depends on which of these paths the members of the Court choose to
pursue.
I. WHITE AND THE RHETORIC OF JUDGING JUDICIAL POLITICS
This section analyzes the rhetoric of cases and commentary on judicial
free speech. I find that pro-speech arguments center on two different
themes: the autonomy of the speaker and the rights of voters to affect the
policy made by judges. Pro-restriction arguments, by contrast, focus on the
risks if the public is permitted to influence judicial policy.
A. The Basics and Breakdown of White
Like other restrictions on judicial campaigning, Minnesota’s announce
clause attempted to protect the courts from public influence by making it
harder for the public to learn information about judicial candidates. If a
candidate cannot run an issue-based campaign, voters are inhibited from
casting votes based on the candidates’ positions on those issues and using
elections to alter judicial policy. Thus, while Republican Party v. White
was a First Amendment challenge to a restriction of campaign speech, the
purposes served by the restrictions may have led some Justices to view the
case in terms of the appropriate role of the courts in limiting majority rule.14
Minnesota defended the announce clause as necessary to promote the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary, as well as the appearance of
independence and impartiality, but the White Court, in an opinion by Justice
Scalia, found the justifications wanting. The Court rejected the idea that
states could have a compelling interest in filling their courts with judges
who had no opinions about disputed legal or political issues,15 and held that
even if the clause encouraged judges to keep an open mind about such
issues,16 the clause was not narrowly tailored to that end and was therefore
unconstitutional.17
Justice Kennedy went even further in his concurrence, concluding that
because the announce clause was a content-based restriction on speech, and
because no traditional exception (such as fighting words, obscenity, and the
like) applied,18 the restrictions were unconstitutional.19 Because Justice
13

Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See generally, e.g., RICHARD D. PARKER, “HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE”: A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST
MANIFESTO (1994).
15
White, 536 U.S. at 777-78.
16
The Court did not decide whether judicial open-mindedness was a compelling interest. See id. at 778.
17
See id. at 778-80.
18
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
14
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Kennedy rejected the strict-scrutiny formula, he found little need to assess
the importance of the justifications Minnesota offered for the announce
clause.20
The four dissenters, in opinions by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg,
countered that open-minded judges were essential to providing due process
for litigants,21 and that the very nature of law requires that judges apply
rules in ways the majority of the electorate dislikes.22 If judges were
permitted to campaign on issues, feared the dissenters, judges would be
unable to protect the rights of the unpopular because voters would elect
only those judges whose decisions would be acceptable to the majority.
Justice Scalia responded with skepticism that such a danger would
materialize from stating one’s views on the issues of the day,23 but
importantly implied that bringing the judiciary more in line with public
attitudes might not be so bad after all. Judges make policy by “shap[ing]”24
constitutions and “‘mak[ing]’”25 common law, the Court reminded us, and
elections were instituted in part because judicial decisions had strayed too
far from majority preferences.26
B. Viewing Speech Restrictions as Protections of Counter-Majoritarian
Power
As Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist, the judiciary must
“depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments.”27 And yet since Marbury v. Madison28 the Supreme Court has
used its power of judicial review to make great changes in American
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
19
See White, 536 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy did suggest, however, that a
different approach might be appropriate when a state “restrict[s] the speech of judges because they are judges –
for example, as part of a code of judicial conduct” rather than when a state restricts judges’ speech because the
judges are candidates. Id. at 796.
20
Id. at 793.
21
See id. at 814-17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
22
See id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
23
See id. at 780-81.
24
Id. at 784 (opinion of the Court).
25
Id.
26
See id. There is some dispute as to the extent to which popular control over the judiciary drove the
movement for judicial elections, but there appears to be rough agreement that disagreement with judicial decisions
under an appointive regime was at least a substantial cause. See Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That
Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 301, 310-14 (2003); Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an
Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860
, 45 THE HISTORIAN 337, 341-50 (1983); Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of
Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190,
205-19 (1993). But see Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan Judicial Elections,
39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397, 1399-1400 (2003) (hereinafter Schotland, To the Endangered Species List)
(arguing that judicial elections were motivated by a desire to raise the quality of the bench, rather than as a way to
alter policy); Roy A. Schotland, Myth, Reality Past and Present, and Judicial Elections, 35 IND. L. REV. 659, 66162 (2002) (hereinafter Schotland, Myth, Reality) (using extended quotation to same effect).
27
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
28
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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society, even as much of the country opposed its decisions.29 How can the
Court be so powerful in practice when its authority on paper seems so
minimal?
The consensus holds that public acceptance of judicial authority allows
courts to hold policy-making power without the purse or the sword. Courts
have legitimacy, in other words, even though their members are largely
unaccountable and even as the public disagrees with individual decisions.30
Scholars have found “diffuse support” among the public for the institutional
judiciary, which gives it the independence to act contrary to the public’s
desires.31 Thus, paradoxically, the Court relies on public sentiment to
enable it to oppose the public sentiment.32 The result is a third branch that
is powerful in individual cases and yet consciously dependent on others for
its continued influence.33
At least since Carolene Products gave voice to the principle that courts
have a special role to play in the defense of individual rights,34 and in all
29
See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Revitalizing Democracy, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165, 171 (2000) (“It
would be incredible, if it were not true, that for the past four or five decades virtually every change in basic issues
of domestic social policy has come not from state or federal legislatures but from the U.S. Supreme Court.”).
30
See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2614-20 (2003).
Interestingly, members of the public who know more about the courts are less likely to support the Supreme Court
if it issues decisions with which those members of the public disagree. See id. at 2617-20 (citing David Adamany
& Joel B. Grossman, Support for the Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker, 5 L. & POL’Y Q. 405 (1983);
Gregory A. Caldeira & James Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI.
635 (1992); and Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations of the
Supreme Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 352 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995)).
31
See Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 30.
32
But the nature of its public support requires that the Court not oppose the public will too much. Justice
Scalia has charged his colleagues with shading their legal interpretations to make them more palatable to the
public and therefore less likely to trigger a movement to curtail the Court’s power. See McCreary County v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. __, __ (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (slip op. at 9) (suggesting that the Court would invalidate
more religious practices under the Establishment Clause were it not for “the instinct for self-preservation, and the
recognition that the Court . . . cannot . . . contradict[] both historical fact and current practice without losing all
that sustains it: The willingness of the people to accept its interpretation of the Constitution as definitive. . .”);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604-05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the principles adopted by
the majority required farther-reaching policy effects than the Court was willing to acknowledge). And of course
the standard interpretation of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), stresses that Marbury “had to
lose,” so that the political branches would not restrict the Court’s power. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Marbury’s
Wrongness, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 343, 357 (2003) (arguing that if Chief Justice Marshall deliberately decided
the case so as to avoid antagonizing the Jefferson administration, his opinion stands for the proposition that “a
judge properly may refuse to do justice under the law in order to advance his own personal power and that of
other judges.”). See generally, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Story of Marbury v. Madison: Making Defeat
Look Like Victory, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 13 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
33
See, e.g., DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 304-07,
327-34 (7th ed. 2005). See generally John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining
Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1999).
In the video that greets visitors to the Supreme Court, Justice Souter points to the fragility of the Court’s
authority: “The power of the Court is the power of trust earned – the trust of the American people.” York
Associates Television, Inc., The Supreme Court of the United States (1997) (quoted in BARBARA A. PERRY, THE
PRIESTLY TRIBE: THE SUPREME COURT’S IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND 5 (1999)); see also, e.g., EUGENE W.
HICKOK & GARY L. MCDOWELL, JUSTICE VS. LAW: COURTS AND POLITICS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY xi (1993);
RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH? 56 (2002) (“The Court’s power rests on its legitimacy. . . .”).
34
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
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likelihood since the Founding,35 the American legal culture has recognized
the benefits of having an independent judiciary protect the people from
excesses of the government and the tyranny of the majority.36 Rash,
bigoted, and ignorant majorities have a sorry history in America and
elsewhere of tyrannizing the unpopular, and courts should have the capacity
to prevent majorities from abusing their power.37 But a judiciary with the
power to check abusive governments also has the power to define the
“abuses”38 and in so doing it risks becoming the proverbial fox guarding the
henhouse.39 Just as some fear overreaching and tyranny by legislative and
popular majorities, others fear overreaching and tyranny by an
unaccountable judiciary; if judges follow their own preferences instead of
the law, judicial independence is destructive not only of democracy but of
the rule of law.40 Thus American judicial power is emblematic of
35

See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 318-20

(1999).
36
See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991) (opinion of the Court by Stevens, J.); West Va. Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution,
103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 83-87 (1989). See also Barnette, 319 U.S. at 665 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court
has no reason for existence if it merely reflects the pressures of the day.”); Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial
Oligarchy, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1996, at 21-24, reprinted in THE END OF DEMOCRACY?: THE JUDICIAL
USURPATION OF POLITICS 10, 13 (Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 1997) (“The Justices are not inscribing current
preferences of our society into the Constitution, for those preferences can easily be placed in statutes by
legislatures.”).
37
See generally Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995).
38
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 828 (1982) (“The
Supreme Court is our society's device for deciding that certain choices are out of bounds. This implies that the
Justices themselves are not constrained by an out-of-bounds rule and ought not to be.”).
39
See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 6 (1977) (“. . . I liked it no better when the Court read my predilections into the Constitution than
when the Four Horsemen read in theirs.”); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Is Judicial Independence a Useful Concept?, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 45, 51 (Stephen B. Burbank
& Barry Friedman eds., 2002); Lino A. Graglia, It’s Not Constitutionalism, It’s Judicial Activism, 19 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 293 (1996). Professor Suzanna Sherry has noted that judges from colonial times to the present
have implemented their will despite conflicting statutory or constitutional text. See Suzanna Sherry, Independent
Judges and Independent Justice, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (1998). She argues, however, that the
independence to exercise independent judgment has “been vindicated by history,” in that we have come to accept
the judicial rulings in such areas as rights of slaves, desegregation, natural rights of property, etc., unpopular at the
time, as correct. Id. at 19. It seems to me questionable whether in fact history has vindicated every exercise of
power she mentions, as even today we dispute whether a court can halt a taking of property undertaken for a
“private” purpose. See id. at 17 (citing In re: Albany Street, 11 Wend. 149, 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834)); Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. __ (2005). As even Professor Sherry recognizes, judicial independence has
enabled tyranny as well as constitutionalism, by permitting judges to render such decisions as Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), which she mentions, see Sherry, supra, at 18, and scores of others,
including Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which she does not.
40
See, e.g., MATTHEW J. FRANCK, AGAINST THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE (1996); CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (provisional page 260) (forthcoming 2006) (“Judicial
independence is defensible only insofar as independent judges follow the law.”); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts
of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 548-58 (1999); Kim Lane Scheppele, Declarations of
Independence: Judicial Reactions to Political Pressure, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra
note 39, at 227, 228 (“[J]udges can (and some judges often) bend the positive law to a judicial conception of what
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governmental power generally and exemplifies the quandary James
Madison identified in framing the Constitution: “what is government itself
but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? . . . [T]he great difficulty
lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”41
White is central in this debate because the motivation behind restrictions
on judicial speech is the promotion of judicial legitimacy, and as a result,
judicial power.42 Public acquiescence in judicial decisions43 is possible
only where courts hold legitimacy,44 and countless symbolic references –
from the Justices’ robes to the marble palace from which they issue their
the law should be, thereby challenging the political branches for the final word on what counts as law in the first
place.”). Scheppele, however, is more accepting of this kind of judicial independence than the quote might
indicate. Cf. Charles Gardner Geyh, Highlighting a Low Point on a High Court: Some Thoughts on the Removal
of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen and the Limits of Judicial Self-Regulation, 68 TEMPLE L.
REV. 1041 (1995) (arguing for some legislative oversight of the judiciary).
I place process-based theorists in the majoritarian category, for they see a role for courts in overseeing the
legislative process only so that the majority’s desires are effected, rather than as a way of imposing particular
substantive values. See generally, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980). Both they and those scholars who more generally disfavor judicial oversight object to judges
who reject the public’s view of good policy when it conflicts with their own, and would therefore approve of
increased public input into judicial selection.
41
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See also RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 204
(2004) (noting that efforts to influence judicial policy through the appointments process “diminish[] the risk of a
runaway judiciary . . . [but] a judiciary that tends to share prevailing cultural norms, and thus to decide cases in
light of them, is not likely to be a very robust guarantor of minority rights . . .”); TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL
ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 131 (2004) (“[T]he Court is
viewed either as the quintessential antidemocratic institution or as an appropriate check on the other branches of
government.”); Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS, supra note 39, at 160, 160-61 (arguing that while light beer may taste great and be less filling,
courts cannot be both independent and accountable); David Goldberger, The Power of Special Interest Groups to
Overwhelm Judicial Election Campaigns: The Troublesome Interaction Between the Code of Judicial Conduct,
Campaign Finance Laws, and the First Amendment, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (“[W]e fear that, if [judges]
are too insulated from the political process, they will take advantage of their independence and exercise arbitrary
power. On the other hand, we want our judges to decide each case based on its individual merits rather than based
on acquiescence to political pressure.”); John M. Walker, Jr., Politics and the Confirmation Process: The
Importance of Congressional Restraint in Safeguarding Judicial Independence, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 1 (2004)
(“[A] dilemma . . . lies at the heart of our constitutional framework: how do we maintain an independent judiciary
to protect democratic institutions and values and, at the same time, avoid unchecked judicial power that would
destroy those institutions and values?”).
42
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (Commentary) (“Deference to the judgments and
rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges.”). The Model Code
contains several references to the importance of maintaining “public confidence” in the judiciary, see, e.g., id.
Canon 2A, making clear that it values legitimacy as necessary to the effective exercise of judicial power.
43
See In re: Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 40 (Mich. 2000) (citing Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and
Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign Speech by Candidates for Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REV. 207,
239-40 (1987)).
44
See id. Canon 1 (Commentary). See also, e.g., O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at xvi (“[The Court’s] political
power . . . truly rests, in Chief Justice Edward White’s words, ‘solely upon the approval of a free people.’”);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-69 (1992) (stressing the damage to the Court’s legitimacy were it
to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and stating that “[t]he Court’s power lies . . . in its legitimacy,”
including “[t]he need for principled action to be perceived as such”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194
(1986) (noting the Court’s concern with being “vulnerable and com[ing] near[] to illegitimacy” in expounding
substantive-due-process doctrine); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing the
need for “sustained public confidence in [the Court’s] moral sanction”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 at 465
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that the judiciary would be the “least dangerous”
branch because it lacked both the power of the purse and of the sword).
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pronouncements – are designed to inspire awe and unquestioning obedience
from the public.45 But the wisdom of inculcating public deference and
respect for the judiciary has been questioned, most notably by some
Justices,46 who view unmediated democracy as occasionally or often
preferable to oligarchical rule by unelected judges.47
Stated differently, courts’ legitimacy is of varying importance to
different judges, depending on their judicial philosophies. Those who
believe that popular majorities pose less of a threat to the law than do
unaccountable judges have an incentive to make judges as responsive to
political desires as possible, and to remove any façade of judicial
omnipotence that inhibits the public from questioning judicial decisions. If
policy is going to be made by judges rather than by legislatures, this
philosophy – which I refer to as “majoritarianism” – argues that voters
should at least be able to select judges who share their policy views.
Majoritarians are skeptical of a “compelling interest” in creating the public
appearance of “neutral” justice, because judges are policy-makers with
social and political views that often preordain their constitutional, statutory,
and common-law interpretations. If those views are to determine the
content of the Constitution and other laws, majoritarians would prefer that
judges have the political views of the median voter, and may therefore be
expected to take a dim view of judicial speech restrictions that embolden
the judiciary to take unpopular positions.48
Those who view courts more as bulwarks against majoritarian excess,
however, have more to fear from an accountable judiciary than do those
who criticize courts for being undemocratic. Accordingly, these countermajoritarians are more receptive to the forced separation of judges from
politics. For them, the judiciary, drawn from the country’s “natural
45

See PERRY, supra note 33.
See GEYH, supra note 40, at (provisional pages 270-71).
47
See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1217-25 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 602-05 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348-49 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 955-56 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and at 980-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstreticians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 794 (1986) (White, J., dissenting));
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 651-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632, 636,
645-46 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999-1001 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
See also ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE 117 (1996); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999);
Lino A. Graglia, Judicial Review: Wrong in Principle, a Disaster in Practice, 21 MISS. C. L. REV. 243 (2002)
(hereinafter Graglia, Judicial Review); Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Law: A Ruse for Government by an
Intellectual Elite, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 767, 770 (1998) (“To the extent that our judges exercise [substantial
policymaking] power today, we can be sure that something has gone wrong and the constitutional scheme is not
being implemented, but perverted.”).
48
Not coincidentally, judicial decisions portrayed as activist were the impetus for the modern push for
judicial accountability. See Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest
State Courts, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 99-107 (1998). See also Hans A. Linde, The Judge as Political
Candidate, 40 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 1, 14 (1991) (“Courts give up their defense against the charge that law is
nothing more than politics when they explain their decisions as a choice of social policy with little effort to
attribute that choice to any law."); Stephen Markman, The Debate over the Judiciary, 35 SUFFOLK L. REV. 443,
451 (2001).
46
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aristocracy,”49 is a moderating force on democracy, and indeed the need for
a judiciary – and indeed the Constitution itself – stems from the fear that the
public will abuse the power of majority rule unless checked.50
Note that this dichotomy between majoritarians and anti-majoritarians
does not necessarily lead to a liberal/conservative split as in White.51
49
Edmund Burke, An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs (1791), in BURKE'S POLITICS 397-98 (Ross J.S.
Hoffman & Paul Levack eds., 1949) (arguing that voters should choose representatives of superior judgment, and
then leave the representatives to exercise that judgment in governing).
50
See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).
51
It may seem odd that majoritarian judges would be more likely to strike down a Canon than would an antimajoritarian. Nevertheless, there are several reasons majoritarians would not exhibit deference to decisions to
restrict judges’ rights of political participation. First, the Canons prohibiting judicial speech are often passed not
by democratically elected majorities in legislatures, but by the very judicial institutions benefited by the
legitimacy that comes from limiting discussion about them. See Republican Party v. White, No. 99-4021, 2005
U.S. App. LEXIS 15864, at *43 n.9 (8th Cir. Aug. 2, 2005) (en banc) (“[T]he fruits of Canon 5 appear to bear
witness to its remarkably pro-incumbent character.”); Dimino, supra note 27, at 811 & n.34. Cf. generally ELY,
supra note 40, at 120 (“We cannot trust the ins to decide who stays out[.]”). Second, insofar as politically
responsible institutions fashion the rules of judicial conduct, judges who are challenging bans on their political
involvement have been prohibited from participating in the process that led to the adoption of the rule. Under
such circumstances, any deference to the state statute is misplaced. Cf. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.
v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 644 n.9 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that deference is inappropriate in campaign-finance cases because legislators can use campaign-finance rules to
entrench themselves in power); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. Number 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969)
(refusing to defer in cases challenging an exclusion from voting). Third, because the right to engage in political
activity is fundamental, strict scrutiny applies. The question is whether the interest asserted by the state is
compelling and whether the means adopted are narrowly tailored to serve the interest. Majoritarian judges are less
likely to see state interests in enabling counter-majoritarian decisions as compelling, or depriving the public of
information as a narrowly tailored means to the end, because both serve the interests of an elite minority at the
expense of the majority. Thus, while it might seem ironic for majoritarian judges to be more likely to strike down
the speech restrictions, the reason they would do so is the protection of the majority from a politically influential
minority.
While a judge who adopts questionable statutory or constitutional interpretations – either conservative or
liberal – because he believes he can improve on the original language is acting in a counter-majoritarian fashion,
see, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (opinion of the Court by Marshall,
C.J.) (requiring Massachusetts to recognize same-sex marriages); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 30-33
(N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting) (arguing that “parent” should mean something other than “biological or
adoptive mother or father” (i.e., could include the homosexual partner of a child’s parent) when an alternative
meaning would be in the child’s best interest); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982); Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and
Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that courts versed in the common law should take an active
role in “mak[ing] law” and policy when engaged in statutory and constitutional interpretation), a judge who
adopts the same interpretation because of public-choice (or other) concerns about the legislature’s
unrepresentativeness would be approaching interpretation from a majoritarian perspective. See, e.g., Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562, 565 (1964) (“Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by
voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. . . . [I]t would seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a
State could elect a majority of that State's legislators.”); Friedman, supra note 30, at 2605 (“[D]uly enacted laws
do not always carry with them popular support.”); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287 (2004)
(arguing that judicial review is not always countermajoritarian, in that legislation does not always reflect the
“majority’s” desires). The power of the first judge, much more than the second, would be threatened by a loss of
judicial legitimacy. See Judith S. Kaye, Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial Independence and Lawyer
Criticism of Courts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703 (1997) (arguing against what Chief Judge Kaye termed
“irresponsible” (chiefly meaning “uninformed”) criticism of judicial decisions, and arguing that lawyers have a
duty to maintain public confidence in the judiciary); id. at 722 (“. . . I personally enjoy the swashbuckling,
romantic notion that judges are impervious "to the winds of public opinion . . . [and that they are people] of
fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.") (alteration in original) (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376
(1947)); Raphael Lewis & Jonathan Saltzman, SJC Chief Justice Counters ‘Judicial Activism’ Charge, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 20, 2004, at A1 (reporting that Massachusetts Chief Justice Marshall “dismissed what she called
‘attack politics’ that sometimes ensnares judges,” preferring to characterize what others have termed “activist
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Indeed, in theory all judges benefit from the political insulation to decide
cases against public desires. In practice, however, a judge whose countermajoritarian preferences would not command a court52 receives no benefit
from the insulation, because the policy that results from the court decision is
not counter-majoritarian. Thus, the only judges for whom independence is
vital are those who hold preferences that are counter to those of the public
and who find agreement among other judges on the court.
Rather than reflecting overall liberal or conservative philosophy, the
split is between judges who agree with the public, by and large in
particularly salient cases,53 and those who do not.54 In the Lochner era,55
when the Supreme Court used the Due Process Clause to invalidate
restrictions on economic liberty, it was in conservatives’ interest to increase
judicial legitimacy (by convincing the public that liberty of contract was
“law,” not “politics”),56 and it was in liberals’ interest to deprive the Court
judges” as merely “doing their constitutional duty”).
52
This analysis raises the question whether judges on multi-member courts would be more likely to exhibit
the tendency discussed here than would be trial-court judges. If trial-court judges are more interested in judicial
independence than are appellate judges, there could be a variety of causes which might form the subject of future
research. The trial judges may not need to concern themselves with attaining the agreement of the rest of their
court for a particular counter-majoritarian opinion, so they may benefit from independence in that independence
would enable the judge not only to state an unpopular position but implement it. On the other hand, judges’
concerns may not be with their own ability to implement their preferred policies, but with the Supreme Court’s
ability to implement policy on a national scale. For trial judges with that attitude, support for judicial
independence should vary according to their agreement with the countermajoritarian decisions of the Supreme
Court. Another factor likely to be important in trial judges’ attitudes toward judicial independence is their
perception of whether they face the brunt of public criticism. If a trial judge is more likely to suffer defeat for an
unpopular decision than is an appellate judge, the trial judge might place a higher value on judicial independence.
If, however, trial-court elections are uncontested and defeat is not a realistic possibility, see generally Michael E.
Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1491-92 (2005), then those judges may be more
accepting of allowing the public to influence other judges.
53
Cf. Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual Justice
Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 468, 489-90 (1997) (hypothesizing that “the
relative salience of the different issue domains determines the relative responsiveness of the justices to mood”).
54
One may refer to the distinction as being between activist and restraintist judges or between interventionist
and non-interventionist ones. See EARL M. MALTZ, RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ORIGINALISM,
INTERVENTIONISM, AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW passim (1994). I prefer not to use the term “judicial
activist” because its meaning is disputed and the phrase is used as more often as an epithet than a descriptive
moniker. See Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an “Activist” Court?: The Commerce Clause Cases, 73
U. COLO. L. REV. 1275, 1275 (2002); Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial
Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2002) (opining that “judicial activism” has been appropriated by
adherents of so many conflicting philosophies as to mean only “Judges Behaving Badly – and each person fills in
a different definition of ‘badly.’”); Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial
Activism,” 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (2004) (surveying the different meanings of the term but arguing that, when
properly defined, “judicial activism” can be a useful term for analyses of judicial decision-making). See generally
Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism, 66 JUDICATURE 236 (1983). For me, a “judicial
activist” is one who reads his own policy preferences into the law under the guise of “interpretation.” See
Laurence H. Silberman, Will Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism: A Retrospective, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 607, 618 (1998). My point has less to do with whether a particular decision is based on a judge’s policy
preferences or the Constitution’s, though, and more with whether the decision supports or opposes the policy
preference seen as popular by the public. To avoid the further risk of confusion, I do not use the term
“democratic” to refer to a conception of judging solicitous of public desires. I prefer the terms “majoritarian” and
“counter-majoritarian” to refer to those judges who validate popular measures and those who oppose them,
respectively.
55
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
56
See, e.g., id. at 56-57 (“This is not a question of substituting the judgment of the court for that of the
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of any legitimacy that came from the invoking the Constitution to conceal a
policy choice.57 Likewise, if the most salient constitutional issue for the
Court was the Contracts Clause, the minimal enforcement of which does not
seem to trouble the public at all,58 then conservatives would be in a position
to fear the decrease in legitimacy that comes from appearing to decide cases
both on the basis of politics59 and inconsistent with majority preferences.60
At this point in our constitutional history, however, conservative
“counter-majoritarian”61 decisions typically are not well covered by the
media and often invalidate statutes the public was not aware existed62 and
that are not “of particular concern to Congress.”63 As a result, decisions
like Seminole Tribe v. Florida,64 New York v. United States,65 and even
United States v. Lopez66 and United States v. Morrison67 are unlikely to
provoke any great public outcry.68 Moreover, on the rare occasions “when
Congress does respond to the Court, it [i.e., Congress] has been compliant.
It has treated Court rulings as final and authoritative – a precedent to deal
with, not to overrule.”69
By contrast, liberal counter-majoritarian decisions in such “politically
legislature. If the act be within the power of the State it is valid, although the judgment of the court might be
totally opposed to the enactment of such a law. But the question would still remain: Is it within the police power
of the State? and that question must be answered by the court.”).
57
See, e.g., id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he accident of our finding certain opinions natural and
familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.”).
58
See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 43 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“The [constitutional] provision prohibiting impairment
of the obligation of contracts . . . has been gutted. I am sure We the People agree with that development; we value
property rights less than the Founders did.”).
59
See, e.g., O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at 330 (“The Court’s prestige rests on preserving the public’s view that
justices base their decisions on interpretations of the law, rather than on their personal policy preferences.”);
James L. Gibson, et al., Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose?: Testing Legitimacy Theory with a
Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL. RES. Q. 187, 192 (2005).
60
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855-56 (1989) (arguing
that originalism operates to preserve liberty where protected in the Constitution, citing the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment and the Contracts Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, as provisions the Court has
insufficiently protected when public opinion has viewed those liberties as undesirable).
61
The federalism cases may not be counter-majoritarian at all, though they involve the invalidation of
statutes. See Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72
U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1299 (2004).
62
See generally Friedman, supra note 30 at 2621-23; Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media,
Knowledge, and Public Evaluations of the Supreme Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 352 (Lee Epstein ed.,
1995) (demonstrating the effect of media coverage on public knowledge of Supreme Court decisions).
63
Neal Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court?, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 72 (2004); see also
Barry Friedman & Anna Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123 (2003).
64
517 U.S. 44 (1997).
65
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
66
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
67
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
68
See Devins, supra note 63, at 66-69 (arguing that the public’s lack of interest in federalism means that the
Court can strike down legislation in that area without being significantly anti-majoritarian); see also Ilya Somin,
Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of
Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1333-36 (2004).
69
Devins, supra note 63, at 73.
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costly, divisive social issues”70 as gay rights,71 religion72 and the death
penalty73 are much more likely to provoke opposition from the public
because they are easier to understand and trigger more emotional reactions
than does, for example, the extent of sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment.74 Thus, while conservatives strike down some laws
supported by majorities of the voting public, the relative lack of salience for
issues of federalism means that they have less to fear if courts’ legitimacy
were undermined than do judges who invoke the ideal of a “living
Constitution” to expand individual rights beyond those the majority wishes
to accept.
Accordingly, if limitations on political involvement are designed to
insulate judges from criticism and protect counter-majoritarian decisions,
the judges we can expect to support those limitations are the judges who
issue decisions at odds with public preferences in salient cases. They have
the most to lose. If the public refuses to follow a judicial decree – either by
adopting a constitutional amendment, attempting to put judges with
opposing views on the bench, encouraging resistance by other branches of
government, or otherwise – then the judge’s preferred decision will have
reduced effect.
Conversely, those judges who decide cases consistent with public views
will likely be the ones least supportive of limitations that increase judicial
legitimacy, for if the judiciary is seen as illegitimate and people lose respect
for the courts, a majoritarian judge has not lost much. Indeed, if the
majoritarian judge has dissented from a counter-majoritarian decision, and
the court’s legitimacy is questioned, the majoritarian judge’s preference is
advanced.
As Professor Pamela Karlan has stated the balance, “we must measure
the claims for judicial freedom against the results judges produce.”75 And
because neither the judiciary, nor the legal community, nor the country has
developed a consensus about what makes a judicial decision “correct,” it is
impossible to make an argument for or against judicial independence that
does not ultimately reduce to expressing a preference for the views of
judicial elites or the public.76 This Article argues that the debate on judicial
70

Id. at 76 (capitalization deleted).
See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
72
See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); Newdow v. United States Congress 328 F.3d 466
(9th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
73
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
74
To be sure, the conservative position on social issues is not always consonant with majority public
opinion. Nevertheless, with some notable exceptions, see, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003),
conservative counter-majoritarianism tends to sustain statutes opposed by certain subsets of the public, whereas
liberal counter-majoritarianism on social issues strikes down popular statutes.
75
Karlan, supra note 40, at 558.
76
See Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System of Judicial “Merit” Selection, 67 ALB. L. REV.
803, 810-18 (2004).
71
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politics should be viewed through this lens of result-orientation.
Both rhetoric and empirical data support the proposition that the debate
over judicial free speech is more about judicial power than free speech.77
Those Justices who favor expansions of judicial power and who use that
power to make unpopular policy – by, for example, issuing decisions
favoring criminal defendants – have supported the speech restrictions, and
have used arguments appealing to the courts’ traditional function as a haven
for individual-rights claimants against an oppressive majority. By contrast,
Justices who favor the more politically popular conservative cause in
criminal cases and who favor restricting judicial power have been those
voting to strike down the restrictions. And the language those Justices have
employed, in judicial opinions and elsewhere, has exhibited a realistic
understanding of the judicial process, under which extra-legal factors affect
judicial decisions and the political process effects policy in part through its
selection of judges.78 The Justices’ positions in free-speech cases – which
might be thought to be of the utmost relevance in evaluating a First
Amendment challenge to restrictions on political speech – turn out not to be
indicative of the Justices’ positions on judicial speech.
C. Why Protect Judges’ Political Speech?: Instrumentalism, Autonomy,
and Realism
There are at least two reasons to support the right of judges to
participate meaningfully in campaigns, and the White majority invoked
both.79 First, judges, like other candidates and autonomous members of a
free society, should have the right to discuss matters of public interest and
to persuade their fellow citizens that a certain policy or set of policies
should be adopted.80 I refer to this as the argument based on “autonomy.”
Second, judicial campaign speech assists voters in selecting candidates, and
candidate discussions of issues assist voters in using elections to shape the
approaches courts will take in addressing those issues. Some critics of
speech restrictions use this “instrumentalist” approach to argue that the
limitations are bad policy because they promote unaccountable policymaking by judges, and unconstitutional because they make judges less
77
Professor Richard Fallon has similarly noted that the Justices’ approaches to questions of commercial
speech neatly correlate with their positions on commercial regulation more generally. See FALLON, supra note 41,
at 49-51.
78
See generally, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); JEFFREY A. SEGAL
& HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
79
These reasons parallel the debate on whether to adopt judicial elections altogether, see Stretton v.
Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991) (gratuitously commenting that adopting
an elective system for selecting judges was “perhaps a decision of questionable wisdom”), providing further
support for believing that the fight in these cases is primarily over judicial power and not the marketplace of ideas
or self-realization through speech.
80
See id. at 781-82, 788 (opinion of the Court) (arguing that speech during election campaigns deserves
particular solicitude from courts).
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accountable to the voters by keeping voters uninformed.81
The autonomy rationale is orthodoxy, “dominat[ing] the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence,”82 and White’s use of the standard
references to the importance of speech in a democracy and the particular
dangers of allowing governmental restriction of electoral speech83 is
therefore unsurprising.84
Nevertheless, speech-as-individual-selfexpression did not figure especially prominently in the majority opinion.85
Though Justice Scalia’s majority opinion contains some language
supportive of the rights of candidates to speak without restriction,86 it quite
clearly leaves open the possibility that a limitation on campaign speech
would be upheld if the interest supporting the limitation was compelling
enough.87 Indeed, the Court disclaimed a broad reading of the passages
invoking the fundamental First Amendment right to participate in politics,
saying that “[w]e rely on the cases involving speech during elections
. . . only to make the obvious point that . . . the First Amendment [does not]
provide[] less protection during an election campaign than at other times.”88
The second, instrumentalist rationale for protecting judicial
campaigning is more controversial. Because courts are less representative
than the political branches, but also make important policy choices,
liberalization of restraints on judicial speech helps members of the public
affect judicially crafted policy.89 That is, if judicial candidates can and do
81
Cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
82
Geoffrey R. Stone, Autonomy and Distrust, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1171, 1171 (1993).
83
See Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774, 781-82 (2002).
84
Just as Justice Kennedy’s approach in White appeared to be centered on rights of free expression, so too
some lower courts approach some judicial-free-speech cases as standard applications of First Amendment
doctrine. See, e.g., Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 207, 213-19 (Ala. 2001); In re: Chmura,
608 N.W.2d 31, 40-43 (Mich. 2000) (applying lessons from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
but also noting that elections and electoral speech allow the public to influence judicial policy).
85
Justice O’Connor’s opinion is difficult to classify under this scheme, for her argument was that judicial
elections necessarily create problems of judicial impartiality, and should therefore be re-thought. Of course, such
a conclusion only begs the question why a state should have to accept issue-based campaigns and/or private
financing of campaigns if it institutes elections. See Schotland, Myth, Reality, supra note 26, at 663 (“‘An
Election Is an Election Is an Election’: The Mantra That Passed for Analysis in the Decisions Limiting Canon
Provisions”). Though Justice O’Connor never directly provided an answer, she appears to view restrictions
suspiciously when they impinge on the ability of voters to educate themselves. Cf. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 775-76 (1978) (noting that the First Amendment protects interests served by the free exchange of
ideas beyond the speaker’s interests). By implying that a state could rid itself of the problems caused by
campaigns if it eliminated elections, she seems to reject the view that speech should be protected because of the
interests of the speaker. See White, 536 U.S. at 792 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“If the State has a problem with
judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing
judges.”). Thus, while Justice O’Connor appears lukewarm about the autonomy rationale from a speaker’s
perspective, she accepts it from a listener’s.
86
See, e.g., id. at 782 (“‘It is simply not the function of government to select which issues are worth
discussing or debating in a political campaign.’ . . . We have never allowed the government to prohibit candidates
from communicating relevant information to voters during an election.”) (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S.
45, 60 (1982)).
87
See, e.g., id. at 774-75 (stating the strict-scrutiny test); 783 (“[W]e neither assert nor imply that the First
Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative office.”)
88
Id. at 783.
89
See White, 536 U.S. at 784, 787-88 (opinion of the Court) (noting the similarity in policy-making authority
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discuss issues, then voters can elect candidates with whom they agree,
judicial decisions implementing policy will be more likely to be consonant
with public opinion, and the courts will be acting in a less countermajoritarian fashion.90 Furthermore, to the extent that the public begins to
see judges as part of the political process,91 judicial decisions will be
evaluated as part of that process as well.92
As a consequence of politicizing or demystifying the courts, the power
of the judiciary will be reduced, for the public may be less willing to respect
and obey the decisions of judges whom they believe to be policy-makers.93
And that potential for altering the power of the courts defines the opposing
camps in the instrumentalist debate over the constitutionality of the
Canons.94 For those who fear the counter-majoritarian exercise of judicial
review – perhaps particularly when untethered to specific constitutional
language – the abandonment of Canons such as the one in White is
attractive because the Canons were adopted to protect judicial independence
and foster acquiescence to judicial power. They use free electoral speech
instrumentally, as a means of discouraging courts from behaving in a
counter-majoritarian fashion. Those supportive of judicial power and
policy-making, on the other hand, support the Canons because they enable
the exercise of that power.
Judges supporting speech restrictions proclaim the importance of the
independence of courts, though they rarely acknowledge the costs of such
independence in terms of judicial unaccountability.95 They, like opponents
of judicial elections, maintain a Langdellian view of judging, where the law
– even the common law – is supposed to develop independent of the public
will96 . . . or at least the public is supposed to think so.97 Though the
between the judiciary and the legislature, and calling attention to the “obvious tension” between judicial elections
and campaign speech restrictions).
90
See, e.g., Dimino, supra note 76, at 817 n.55 (“Insofar as the common law pronounced by unelected courts
is reflective of the personal policy views of the judges, . . . it appears wholly oligarchical to subject the populace
to judges’ policy ideals without imposing an electoral check on judicial decisions.”); Dimino, supra note 26, at
376-78.
91
See generally RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION PROCESS
(2005) (arguing that the process of staffing the Supreme Court has come to involve an electoral process, complete
with the involvement of interest groups, the media, and the public).
92
See generally TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999) (advocating such a
result).
93
See Gibson, et al., supra note 59.
94
Cf. Burt Neuborne, Free Expression and the Rehnquist Court, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: A
RETROSPECTIVE 15, 24 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002) (noting that the Rehnquist Court’s approach to First
Amendment cases has lacked any “normative theory”; rather, it views voting “solely as an instrumental exercise,”
a method of choosing leaders and shaping policy rather than as a tool for expression).
95
While most decisions and commentary fall quite clearly into either the free-speech or pro-restriction
camps, some try to find a middle approach. The best example is Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224,
227-28 (7th Cir. 1993), where Judge Posner argued in dicta that judicial candidates must be granted some freedom
to speak, but need not be granted as much protection as candidates for legislative office.
96
See Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 799 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). .Political science is, to say the least, skeptical of this argument. Research has demonstrated that the
Justices’ policy views are far more predictive of their votes than are legal factors. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH,
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dissenters in White and others who defend the restrictions repeatedly claim
that judges do not implement their preferred policies as law, they make no
attempt to demonstrate this dubious claim. Pro-restriction decisions rarely
acknowledge the role public opinion98 and personal preference99 play in
judicial decisions,100 and instead rely on the worn protestations that judges
“‘shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of
criticism.’”101
The contrasting realism of pro-speech decisions, as in White, consists of
two revelations (or admissions): judges make policy,102 and that policy is
influenced by the philosophies of the judges.103 Thus while supporters of
speech restrictions take pains to demonstrate the calamity of adjusting the
law to accommodate public desires, opponents welcome the possibility:
“‘[T]he fact that candidates and elected officials may alter or reaffirm their
own positions on issues in response to political messages . . . can hardly be
called corruption, for one of the essential features of democracy is the
presentation to the electorate of varying points of view.’”104 For proponents
supra note 78. Cf. Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism, and John Paul Stevens, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE:
UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 157, 177 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003) (reporting Justice Douglas’s
recounting of a conversation with Chief Justice Hughes, the substance of which Douglas found to be “true,” in
which Douglas was told, “At the constitutional level where we work, ninety percent of any decision is emotional.
The rational part of us supplies the reasons for supporting our predilections.”).
97
See In re: Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam).
98
See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6
J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957) (“[T]he policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the
policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”); Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The
Worst Way of Selecting Judges – Except All the Others That Have Been Tried, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 267, 271-72 nn.
24-25 (2005) (citing studies discussing the relationship between public opinion and court decisions); Kevin
McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court
Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POLS. 1018 (2004). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); Robert C. Post,
The Supreme Court, 2002 Term – Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003).
99
See generally, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 78; Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in
the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (1997) (accepting that Justices
occasionally act strategically, taking account of other actors’ preferences, but arguing that such strategic action is
rarely necessary because of the difficulty other branches face in overturning Court decisions). Other analysts
argue that Justices vote strategically, tempering their policy preferences as necessary to obtain majorities within
the Court and to avoid retribution from the other branches. See generally, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT,
THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); MURPHY, supra note 78; Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a
Strategic National Policy-Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 592 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 372-89 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging
on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 641-64 (1991).
100
See Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142 (speculating the disasters that might befall the judicial system if judicial
candidates were to prejudge cases during campaigns).
101
In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 89 (Fla. 2003) (quoting FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3B(2)).
102
See Republican Party v. White, No. 99-4021, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15864, at *10-*15 (8th Cir. Aug. 2,
2005) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (citing Dimino, supra note 26, and Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and
Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 594 (2002)).
103
See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002) (“We agree that the distinction between
judicial elections and other types of elections has been greatly exaggerated . . .”); Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280,
294 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“One would have to be exceedingly naive not to be aware that a judge's judicial
philosophy may influence his or her votes on important public issues. . .”).
104
Geary, 911 F.2d at 284 (opinion of the court) (quoting Fed’l Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985) (ellipsis in Geary; opening capitalization added).
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of judicial free speech, campaigns and elections are opportunities for the
sovereign people to exert control over their government.105 For proponents
of speech restrictions, campaigns are chances for sleazy, opportunistic,
deceptive “politicians” (shudder) to manipulate the voters or exploit their
prejudices.106
These restrictions on political speech and conduct are in place, the ABA
tells us, so that “the dignity appropriate to judicial office” and “the
impartiality, integrity and independence of the judiciary” will be
protected.107 “Integrity” may be the most direct expression of the legal
profession’s attempt to cloak the courts in prestige and denigrate the other
branches. As Professor Bradley Wendel noted, judges “debas[e] the
democratic process” “as if they might get their robes dirty among the hoipolloi.”108 Thus, supporters of restrictions in judicial campaigns contend
that “[a] judge's ability to render a reasoned decision should not be clouded
by the fear that a challenger can twist words or allege distorted facts in an
election campaign,” but other governmental officials must tolerate precisely
that risk.109 Judges must be “set . . . aside from the hurly-burly of
sometimes unseemly political strife.”110 And so on. By prescribing that
judges not engage in politics and justifying that prohibition with an appeal
to “integrity,” the unmistakable implication is that the “political branches”
lack the integrity that courts should have. Indeed, the chief fear among
proponents of judicial speech and political-participation restrictions is that
judges will be seen by the public to be politicians, little different from
officials in other branches.111
105

See Republican Party v. White, No. 99-4021, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15864, at *14 (8th Cir. Aug. 2,
2005) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (“[C]ourts are involved in the policy process to an extent that makes election
of judges a reasonable alternative to appointment.”); id. at *17 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1976) (per curiam)); In re: Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 42-43 (Mich. 2000). As a matter of fact, the ignorance of
voters in judicial elections makes it difficult for elections to exert much influence on the direction of judicial
policy. See generally, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, The False Promise of Judicial Elections in Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L.
REV. 559, 562-66 (2002). The solution to this problem, however, may be to provide voters with more information
by loosening restrictions on judicial campaigning. See, e.g., Anca Cornis-Pop, Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White and the Announce Clause in Light of Theories of Judge and Voter Decisionmaking: With Strategic Judges
and Rational Voters, the Supreme Court Was Right to Strike Down the Clause, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 123
(2004); Dimino, supra note 98, at 299-300. One effect of White, therefore, may be to make judicial elections
more meaningful opportunities for voters to influence the judiciary, for better (if one is a majoritarian) or worse (if
one is a counter-majoritarian).
106
See, e.g., Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 207, 224 (Ala. 2001) (Houston, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that “[c]ore political speech in the 1994 and 1996 Alabama judicial elections had run
amok.”).
107
ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(a) (1990).
108
W. Bradley Wendel, The Ideology of Judging and the First Amendment in Judicial Election Campaigns,
43 S. TEX. L. REV. 73, 105 (2001).
109
In re Donohoe, 580 P.2d 1093, 1097 (Wash. 1978).
110
Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1059, 1067 (1996).
111
See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991); In re:
Amendment of the Code of Judicial Conduct, No. C4-85-697, slip. op. at 4 (Minn. Sept. 14, 2004). Cf. Monroe H.
Freedman, The Threat to Judicial Independence by Criticism of Judges – A Proposed Solution to the Real
Problem, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729, 737 (1997) (“Much of the judicial hand-wringing about criticism of judges
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Integrity is not an end in itself, however; the restrictions on political
activity are in place not to make judges feel that they are better people or
are part of a better profession for refraining from politics. Instead, the goal
is power or, as one scholar put it, “the judiciary’s moral and political
authority”112: instilling confidence among the members of the public, so that
they will accept judicial rulings as both the embodiments and applications
of “law.” The people will vest courts with this undemocratic power only if
judges look like they will exercise it wisely.113
Relatedly, the rhetoric of judges upholding restrictions on judicial
politics is often elitist, evincing contempt for the ignorance of the public or
at least a patronizing dismissal of their concerns. The message is clear:
“You don’t understand what courts do or how important we are; you’re just
focused on results and locking up criminals. Luckily, you have us to look
after you and protect your rights.”114 Accordingly, pro-restriction judges
and commentators often emphasize the need for “voter education” efforts,
through which the public is supposed to learn115 “the importance of an
impartial and independent judiciary.”116
Similarly, instrumentalist critics of the restrictions rely on the idea that
the law is manipulable by policy-driven human judges, because the
instrumental movement is designed to allow the law to change based on the
public’s desires.117 Judges formulate policy, said the Court, and in a
has more to do with judicial vanity than with judicial independence.”).
112
Aman McLeod, If at First You Don’t Succeed: A Critical Evaluation of Judicial Selection Reform Efforts,
107 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 509 (2005).
113
See, e.g., In re: Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 399-400 (Wash. 1988).
114
See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965) (“A state may also properly protect the judicial process
from being misjudged in the minds of the public.”); In re: Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2003) (“A campaign
pledge to favor one group over another if elected has the additional deleterious effect of miseducating voters about
the role of the judiciary. . . Campaign promises that suggest [that judges can aid particular groups] gravely risk
distorting public perception of the judicial role.”). Cf. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (“A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our membership
invites the popular misconception that this institution is little different from the two political branches of the
Government. No misconception could do more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it is our
abiding mission to serve.”).
115
Cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 94 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting the “mental
reservations one has in teaching of Santa Claus or Uncle Sam or Easter bunnies or dispassionate judges.”).
116
Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 994-95 (2001) (“Public
outreach efforts promote judicial independence, because they enable citizens to evaluate critical attacks on judges
and to value judicial independence . . . Judicial elections can and should serve to educate the public about . . . the
core value of decisional independence.”). See also Phyllis Williams Kotey, Public Financing for Non-Partisan
Judicial Campaigns: Protecting Judicial Independence While Ensuring Judicial Impartiality, 38 AKRON L. REV.
597, 615, 619-20 (2005). Interestingly, Judge Kotay’s prescription recognizes that any such education program
must be “balanced,” but does not see the program itself as unbalanced in promoting judicial independence.
Interest groups have also taken to using “voter education” programs, whose balance is questionable. See Emily
Heller, Judicial Races Get Meaner, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 25, 2004, at 1 (describing the efforts of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce in educating voters about the need to elect tort-reform-minded judges).
117
Cf. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (“[A]n agency . . . may . . .
properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments [as to the meaning
of statutes]”); Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185, 194 (2004)
(“Chevron gives agencies the flexibility to change and adapt their policies to reflect the current state of affairs and
political attitudes.”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2085, 2129 (2002) (arguing that Chevron “allows the content of an act of Congress to change with the changing
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democracy the voters118 should have a role to play in influencing the policymakers.119
To illustrate the immense counter-majoritarian power possessed by
courts in the interpretation of common and constitutional law, Justice Scalia
cited Baker v. State,120 in which the Vermont Supreme Court required that
state to provide marriage-like benefits to same-sex couples.121 By pointing
to the policy-making power of courts and invoking a decision taking sides
in one of the most divisive issues of the day, Justice Scalia not only invited
the public to look at the authority of the courts, but to look at the basis on
which judges decide cases. The majority opinion explicitly compared the
judiciary to the other branches, saying that they are part of the states’
“representative government”122 and opining that the dissenters
“exaggerate[d] the difference between judicial and legislative elections.”123
Citing Baker in the context of that discussion says to the country what
Justice Scalia has been saying for years in dissenting opinions:124 court
decisions are judicially imposed policy often lacking much connection to
the law being “interpreted,” little different from the actions of
legislatures.125
Recognizing that courts have policy-making power and that they use
that power to advance their visions of justice requires looking beneath the
veneer of “judicial impartiality.” If judges’ personal views do not matter to
the decision of cases, or if judges lack the power to make policy, then voters
have little interest in knowing what judges’ views are. But White
acknowledges that judges’ personal views do matter,126 and argues from
that fact that voters should have access to that information, if the candidates

policy views of the executive branch.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 2071, 2103 (1990) (noting that under Chevron changes in executive-branch preferences can alter the law).
118
Of course this argument does not go so far as to require states to elect judges; rather, it requires them to
accord rights of free speech “[i]f the State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic
process. . .” White, 536 U.S. at 788.
119
See id. at 784 (“Not only do state-court judges possess the power to ‘make’ common law, but they have
the power to shape the States’ constitutions as well. . . . Which is precisely why the election of state judges
became popular.”). See also id. at 787-88 (noting the “obvious tension” between the announce clause and an
elected judiciary).
120
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
121
White, 536 U.S. at 784; Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), though
providing an even greater illustration of Justice Scalia’s point by interpreting the Massachusetts Constitution to
require that state to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples, was not decided at the time White was. The
point is not just that liberal courts are policy-makers, but that courts possess counter-majoritarian policy-making
power and they invoke that power based on their own feelings about what the law should be.
122
White, 536 U.S. at 784.
123
Id.
124
See infra notes 211-21 and accompanying text.
125
The Court’s comparison between the approaches of courts and legislatures, see also BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-15 (1921), might suggest that the same freedom of speech
that prevails in legislative campaigns, see Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116,
132-37 (1966), is applicable to judicial ones. See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1320-22 (11th Cir. 2002).
126
See White, 536 U.S. at 784 n.12.
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are inclined to share it.127 The dissenters saw judges as the human
embodiments of law and understood public involvement in the judicial
process as threatening to that ideal precisely because, as fallible government
officials, judges might not always hew to the law when their electoral
fortunes rest in the balance. Thus, both the majority and the dissents
appeared to recognize that the exercise of First Amendment rights by
candidates and voters could affect the administration of justice.128
Nevertheless, in their rhetoric about the legal process, supporters of
speech restrictions at most grudgingly acknowledge legal realism, stressing
that judges must be perceived as being bound by external law and deciding
cases without an agenda,129 even if that is inaccurate.130 Some pro127

See id. at 783-84 & n.11, 787-88.
The realism supporting both the autonomy and self-government approaches to White suggests that judges
are not “employees” of the government whose speech can be restricted as a condition of employment. Cf. United
States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the RightPrivilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). It would be anomalous to permit the
government-as-employer to restrict an elected official’s speech when (after White) he may be in office precisely
because of his ability to speak his views on disputed issues. How much harm can it do to the judiciary to know
that a judge who campaigned based on his views on certain issues continues to believe them?
129
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 157-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting); In re:
Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1292-93 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (“[W]ithout public confidence, the judicial branch
could not function.”); In re: Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (“‘[T]he perception of impartiality
is as important as actual impartiality.’”) (quoting In re: Duckman, 699 N.E.2d 872, 878 (N.Y. 1998) (per
curiam)).. There is some indication that the public maintains an unrealistic perception of the judiciary. See
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 78, at 8 (“[T]he fairy tale of a discretionless judiciary survives. . . [T]he bulk of the
public simply will not allow themselves to be confused by the fact of judicial policy making.”). Recent wrangling
over Senate confirmation of judges, though, may be either the cause or the effect of an increased public awareness
of discretionary judicial policy-making. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part), 999-1001 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Edith H. Jones, Foreword to Symposium: The Ethics of Judicial
Selection, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2001). Cf. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Supreme
Court’s Image Declines as Nomination Battle Looms: Court Critics Now on Both Left and Right, at <http://
people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=247> (June 15, 2005). More likely, it is interest groups, rather
than the disaggregated public, that have figured out both the game and the stakes. See generally MICHAEL J.
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 219 (rev.
ed. 2003) (noting that although interest groups have played an increased role in the appointment process,
“individual citizens have rarely wielded direct influence over the process); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND
CONGRESS 18-19(1997); Gregory A. Caldeira et al., The Lobbying Activities of Organized Interests in Federal
Judicial Nominations, 62 J. POLS. 51 (2000); Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice:
Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States Senate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 499 (1998);
Christine DeGregorio & Jack E. Rossotti, Campaigning for the Court: Interest Group Participation in the Bork
and Thomas Confirmation Processes, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 215 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis
eds., 4th ed. 1995); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents,
Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96, 105-06 (1992); Peter
Schuck, Against (and for) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 553 (1997).
130
Compare, e.g., Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d at 290-91 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (noting the multitude of
interest groups that seek to influence judges, and arguing that the influence of parties is therefore unexceptional),
with id. at 311-14 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (claiming that the influence of parties threatens judicial independence).
See Robert H. Alsdorf, The Sound of Silence: Thoughts of a Sitting Judge on the Problem of Free Speech and the
Judiciary in a Democracy, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 197, 219 (2003) (“I concede that judges are human.
Sometimes we do act on personal beliefs. A pure and unalloyed allegiance to the law is something of a fiction, but
it is the aspiration, the attempt to find the law that is crucial, however hobbled or imperfect our efforts may
sometimes be.”); James C. Foster, The Interplay of Legitimacy, Elections, and Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Making
Sense of Politicization of Oregon’s Appellate Courts, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1313, 1316-17 (2003) (arguing
that the popular perception of judges and law as separate from politics “has the singularly unfortunate
consequence of making judicial independence wholly contingent upon a profound social misperception of the
128
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restriction writings explicitly tie public perceptions to judicial power,131
arguing that public respect for judges is necessary to support “the justice
system upon which the public relies to resolve all manner of controversy,
civil and criminal.”132 And because nobody knows with any certainty what
might cause public esteem for the courts to suffer, supporters of restrictions
can claim that the Canons are narrowly tailored to avoid the “appearance”
of impropriety,133 even if detractors can refute claims that independence or
integrity is actually threatened by loosening the restrictions.134
Only by claiming that judges enforce the law – not their policy
preferences135 – can supporters of restrictions avoid the counter-majoritarian
critique and the concomitant pressure to make the courts more
accountable.136 Speech-restriction supporters are therefore willing to
employ “a normative, idealized view of judges as apolitical disputeresolvers,” while opponents of the restrictions are more comfortable using
“a descriptive, post-realist recognition that in practice the judiciary
exercises significant policymaking functions.”137 Within an instrumentalist
judicial role.”). See also Farnsworth, supra note 96, at 177-78 (arguing that Justice Stevens’s frequent rejection of
legal realism in his opinions stands in marked contrast to the results in those opinions, which are the applications
of his “values” rather than law).
131
See, e.g., In re: McCormick, 639 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 2002) (“The strength of our judicial system is due
in large part to its independence and neutrality . . . [which] promote public respect and confidence in our system
of justice.”). See also White, 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[Judges] occupy an office of trust that is
fundamentally different from that occupied by policymaking officials.”); 798 (“[I]t is the business of legislators
and executives to be popular. . . . it is the business of judges to be indifferent to popularity.”); 802 (“[T]he
standards for the election of political candidates [should not] apply equally to candidates for judicial office.”); 802
n.4 (“[T]he same standards should not apply to speech in campaigns for judicial and legislative office.”); 803
(arguing that different criteria should apply to the election to judicial and political office); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s implicit criticism of the Florida Supreme
Court would unwisely damage public confidence in the judiciary).
132
Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 7 (quoting In re: Mazzei, 618 N.E.2d 123, 125 (N.Y. 1993) (per curiam)). Mazzei
continued, in even more specific language: “A society that empowers Judges to decide the fate of human beings
and the disposition of property has the right to insist upon the highest level of judicial honesty and integrity. A
Judge's conduct that departs from this high standard erodes the public confidence in our justice system so vital to
its effective functioning.”).
133
See, e.g., In re: Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1292-93 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam).
134
See In re: Campbell, 2004 Annual Report __ (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 12, 2004) (Emery,
C., concurring) (“[M]y colleagues[’] . . . statement that the Rule is ‘narrowly drawn’ because it prohibits political
activity ‘with certain defined exceptions during a judge's own campaign for election’ is tautological and fails to
consider the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of the Rule.”); In re: Farrell, 2004 Annual Report __ (N.Y.
Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 24, 2004) (Emery, C., concurring).
135
See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Elected judges, no less than appointed judges,
occupy an office of trust that is fundamentally different from that occupied by policymaking officials.”).
136
See, e.g., Thomas L. Jipping, From Least Dangerous Branch to Most Profound Legacy: The High Stakes
in Judicial Selection, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 365, 458 (2000) (“[By inviting judges] to change the law they
apply[, judicial activism] is inconsistent with self-government and ordered liberty because it takes the lawmaking
power away from the people and their elected representatives and makes the judiciary more powerful than the
other branches of government.”).
137
Michael Herz, Choosing Between Normative and Descriptive Versions of the Judicial Role, 75 MARQ. L.
REV. 725, 726 (1992); see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 244 (1930) (“Myth-making and
fatherly lies must be abandoned . . . We must stop telling stork fibs about how a law is born and cease even
hinting that perhaps there is still some truth in Peter Pan legends of a juristic happy hunting ground in a land of
legal absolutes.”); JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 156
(2005):
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framework, then, one can reach either a speech-protective or a speechrestrictive result, depending on “whether we look to judges as they are or as
they are supposed to be.”138
Nowhere is this difference in approaches more apparent than in the
Court’s discussions of the meaning of judicial “impartiality.” The White
dissenters, like other supporters of judicial-speech restrictions,139 repeatedly
invoked the need for impartiality, and argued that a judge who had
announced his intention to decide an issue one way or another would violate
due process by sitting in a case involving that issue.140 The Court rejected
this due-process argument – an unexceptional result in itself, as no prior
Supreme Court case as much as implied that judges must refrain from
developing positions about legal issues141 – but importantly it did so relying
upon a realistic vision of who judges are and how they go about deciding
cases.142 The Court flatly rejected the idea (though something of a straw
Contrasted with the majority [in White], the minority made disingenuous arguments
demeaning the intelligence of even the most vapid citizen. Reverting to the myth of an
objective, dispassionate, and impartial judiciary, the dissent averred that judicial
campaignsfundamentally differ from those for policy-making offices; that judges occupy a
special position of trust not possessed by other officials; and that if they do not adhere to
what they said once in office, judicial independence and impartiality would be
compromised and undermined.
Professor Herz notes that Justice Scalia, the author of White, is one of the Justices typically willing to
indulge the fiction that judges do not make law. See id. at 765. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia uses the myth of lawfinding for a different purpose than do anti-majoritarians. Rather than arguing that the public must perceive courts
as law-finders so that courts are better respected, Justice Scalia argues that courts should act as if they are lawfinders, because that properly constrains their discretion. See id. at 763 (discussing James B. Beam Distilling Co.
v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)); Larry Kramer, Judicial Asceticism, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1797 (1991). Indeed, where a law-finder vision of courts impedes his ability to achieve
what he views as the correct result, Justice Scalia rejects it for a more realistic vision. See Herz, supra, at 754
(discussing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Thus, while Justice Scalia
uses traditional imagery of judicial omniscience, he does so with a wink and a nod, and for the purpose of
constraining courts rather than emboldening them.
138
Herz, supra note 137, at 744. Cf. NIXON, (Hollywood Pictures 1995) (Nixon, addressing a portrait of
President Kennedy: “When they look at you, they see what they want to be. When they look at me, they see what
they are.”).
139
See Republican Party v. White, No. 99-4021, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15864, at *75-*82 (8th Cir. Aug. 2,
2005) (en banc) (Gibson, J., dissenting); Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 313 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Alarcon, J., dissenting); In re: Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 959-60 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam); In re: Raab, 793 N.E.2d
1287, 1290-91 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (“[T]he rights of judicial candidates and voters are not the only interests
the State must consider . . .”); Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 6-7; Schotland, Myth, Reality, supra note 26, at 665-66;
Shepard, supra note 110; see also MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5E (“‘Impartiality’ or
‘impartial’ denotes absence of bias or prejudice . . . as well as maintaining an open mind in considering issues that
may come before the judge.”); WISCONSIN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Supreme Court Rule 60.01 (7m) (2004)
(same).
140
See Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 800-02 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 813-19
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
141
See Dimino, supra note 26, at 338-46 (arguing that there is no due-process right to have a judge who
approaches each issue without preconception). But see Watson v. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 794 N.E.2d
1, 6-7 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (opining that “openmindedness” of judges is a requirement of due process); In re
Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 959-60 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam) (dictum) (citing “due process and due course of law” as
constitutional rights “threat[ened]” by allowing judicial candidates to run unregulated campaigns).
142
White opined that it is perfectly consistent with due process to have a judge elected who knows that his
job may depend on deciding a particular case one way or another. See Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765,
782-83 (2002). Some defenders of restrictions argue that due process requires an “openminded” judge, and White
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man) that states would be served by having judges come to each case with a
mind completely devoid of preconceptions about how an issue in the case
should be decided.143 On the contrary, the Court noted the beneficial
aspects of having experienced judges and lawyers – persons whose careers
would necessarily predispose them to certain views on issues – running for
the bench. It was unwise, in the Court’s view, for a state to use speech
restrictions to limit judgeships to those lawyers who have such limited
experience as not to have required them to take positions on legal issues.144
Accordingly, the Court, in evaluating the justifications for judicial speech
restrictions, has taken a realistic view of the judicial selection process, and
understands that judges have careers that affect the way they see legal
problems once on the bench. This lesson may be translated quite easily into
the context of party involvement and extra-judicial campaign activity: It
would hardly escape the Court’s notice that judges have often been active in
politics before their appointments,145 and judges are often well connected to
important players in the political branches.146
The autonomy and instrumentality rationales supporting the result in
White may not always argue for invalidating restrictions on political
conduct, even for those who used instrumentalism as a way of undermining
judicial power. Restrictions on political activity that do not hinder voters’
ability to obtain information and affect judicial policy are not impediments
to self-governance, and therefore may not be opposed by majoritarian
instrumentalists. As a result, the constitutionality of some restrictions on
judges’ political activity could depend on the analytical paradigm the Court
chooses to employ: the systemic, instrumental use of free speech to promote
self-government or advancement of free speech as a tool for libertarian selfrealization.147 While an autonomy theory of the First Amendment might
call for the invalidation of all content-based restrictions on judicial speech,
the instrumental theory might uphold restrictions that serve other goals.
left open the possibility that openmindedness was a “desirable” trait for the judiciary, id. at 778, but the Court then
noted that judges regularly make commitments outside of election campaigns that do not raise any due-process
concerns. See id. at 779-81.
143
See id. at 777-78.
144
See id. (citing Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J., respecting
recusal)).
145
See Republican Party v. White, No. 99-4021, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15864, at *41-*42 (8th Cir. Aug. 2,
2005) (en banc). See generally, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY
OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON (rev. ed. 1999); SHELDON
GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997);
The Justices of the Supreme Court, available at <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf>
(last visited Sept. 23, 2004).
146
See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 916-17 (2004) (memorandum of Scalia, J.,
respecting recusal).
147
See Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 339-40 (1993) (distinguishing
between two justifications for protecting free speech: the “instrumentalist” justification, which “views the freedom
of speech as a tool for achieving certain societal objectives,” and the justification “focuse[d] on the constitutive
value of speech,” which argues for protecting speech “because it is essential to one’s dignity or self-fulfillment,
vital aspects of one’s identity”).
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Perhaps, however, the White Court’s realism may indicate that speech
restrictions will continue to be struck down if their defense rests upon an
inaccurate, romanticized vision of judging.
Few courts have directly confronted these issues since White, and the
cases that have been decided have reached widely varying results. While
the Eleventh Circuit interpreted White to mean that judges and other elected
officials are protected by the First Amendment to the same degree,148 some
courts have upheld restrictions on judicial speech that would be
“unthinkable”149 were they applied to officials in the political branches.150
What, then, motivates those courts and commentators maintaining that the
judiciary is simply different, and the First Amendment need not mean
precisely the same wide-open debate in the judicial arena as it does
elsewhere? The difference in approach, I argue, is the felt need to ensure
that courts retain a mystery, an awe-inspiring quality inducing
unquestioning adherence to judicial decrees.
II. EXPLAINING THE VOTES
On first inspection, it appears peculiar that the four most liberal Justices
voted in White to uphold a restriction on speech, while the five most
conservative voted to strike it down. One might have thought that if White
were to break down on ideological lines, the breakdown would be precisely
the opposite of what occurred, with the conservatives supporting an exercise
of government power and the liberals favoring the individual’s exercise of a
fundamental civil liberty. Simplistic visions of liberalism and conservatism
therefore fail to explain the votes in White, and something else is driving the
Justices’ positions on judicial free speech.
A. White as a Free-Speech Case
In free-speech cases,151 “conservatives” on the Rehnquist Court are not
a monolithic bloc152 in favor of government power at the expense of the
148

See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002); see also White, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
15864 (8th Cir. Aug. 2, 2005); Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72
(N.D.N.Y.), vacated on abstention grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2812 (2004).
149
Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, supra note 26, at 1400.
150
See In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003); In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338, 347-51 (Me. 2003), cert.
denied 124 S. Ct. 1722 (2004); In re: Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam); In re: Watson, 794 N.E.2d
1 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam).
151
See Burt Neuborne, Free Expression and the Rehnquist Court, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: A
RETROSPECTIVE 15, 15 (Martin H. Belsky, ed. 2002) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court has been very protective
of expression despite the efforts of its namesake); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term: Forward:
We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 130 (2001); Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases,
1994-2000
, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1191 (2001); Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1211 (2002); Keith Werhan, The Liberalization of Freedom of Speech on a Conservative
Court, 80 IOWA L. REV. 51 (1994).
152
See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 213 (2000) (noting the
influence of “shifting majorities” in freedom-of-expression and freedom-of-association cases).
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individual.153 We might therefore anticipate votes based not on a Justice’s
general tendency to uphold exercises of government power, but rather on a
Justice’s willingness to tolerate governmental action in free-speech cases.
Professor Eugene Volokh has documented the Justices’ votes in speech
cases and has demonstrated that in order of increasing acceptance of freespeech claims, the Justices rank as follows: Breyer, Rehnquist, O’Connor,
Scalia, Ginsburg, Stevens, Thomas, Souter, and Kennedy.154 Under such an
analysis, and assuming White was to be a 5-4 decision one way or the other,
we might expect Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Souter, and Stevens to vote to
strike down the Minnesota announce clause, and we might expect Justices
Breyer, Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Scalia to uphold it. Justice Ginsburg,
being the median Justice in free-speech cases, could vote either way without
making her vote surprising relative to the positions of the others.
But as it turned out, the majority was one often seen in high-profile
constitutional decisions outside of the free-speech context: Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined with Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas to
constitute the majority; Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
made an opposing bloc. The votes of Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Souter,
Stevens, and Scalia in White are surprising, if one anticipated a split
typically seen in cases involving free-speech claims.
Taking First Amendment cases in total, rather than analyzing just freespeech cases, is no more helpful in explaining White:

153
See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 89, 93-96 (2005) (describing Justice Thomas’s natural-law-based libertarianism). Political scientist Richard
Brisbin argued that Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence was distinctly conservative, despite occasional flashes of
libertarianism, as in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), and Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). See
RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 220-24 (1997).
154
Justices Souter and Thomas were close enough to be tied, but Professor Volokh’s study included White
itself as a data point.
See Volokh, supra note 151, appendix (web version), at
<http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/howvoted.htm>. Without that case, Justice Souter would be ranked secondmost speech-protective, and Justice Thomas third. In any event, the important point for purposes of my analysis is
that both Justices were more protective of speech than were Justice Ginsburg, the median Justice.
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As the chart illustrates, the five most conservative Justices on First
Amendment Cases, i.e., the five most likely to reject an individual’s First
Amendment claim, are the five who voted to sustain such a claim in
White.155 The data are consistent whether one uses the total number of First
Amendment cases a Justice has heard from his or her appointment through
the 2001 Term (the first column)156 or just those cases decided in the 19942003 Terms (the second column).157
B. Fear of Electoral Chaos
If one looked at White as a case involving the regulation of the
democratic process rather than one about free-speech rights,158 one would
155

A “liberal” decision was one supporting the rights-claimant. See HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE ORIGINAL
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE, 1953-2003 TERMS: DOCUMENTATION 58 (2005), at
<http://www. as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/allcourt_codebook.pdf> (last visited July 29, 2005).
156
EPSTEIN, ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 486-89
(3d ed. 2003).
157
I gathered this data by using the Supreme Court Judicial Database, limiting the Terms to 1994 and later,
the issues to numbers 401-72, excluding memorandum decisions but including per curiam decisions with or
without oral argument, and excluding cases where a Justice’s vote was other than 0 (conservative) or 1 (liberal).
The database is accessible at <http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm>. I compiled this data on
March 8, 2005. Limiting the data to the 1994-2003 Terms readily permits a comparison between the Justices
because, with few exceptions owing to recusals, all the Justices heard the same cases. The third column uses more
cases for Justices who have been on the Court longer than Justice Breyer and may therefore yield a more precise
picture of the Justices’ views, at the cost of using different data sets for each Justice.
158
Cf. Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV.
28 (2004) (arguing that the Court relies too heavily on an individual-rights paradigm when confronting cases
dealing with the regulation of democracy).
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have been further confused by the Justices’ votes. In electoral-regulation
cases, the Justices making the White majority have been those Professor
Richard Pildes has identified as most fearful of an unrestrained electoral
process, and most willing to impose stability on electoral systems.159 Yet,
in White, those Justices were willing to overturn a fairly stable system and
require states to tolerate campaigns that states feared would upset the role of
the state judiciary.
Judicial elections add unpredictability to the law, and restrictions on
judicial campaigning are, in part, an effort to limit that unpredictability.
Any system of elections threatens to upset expectations about the personnel
that staff judicial offices, but issue-based campaigning may upset the
stability of the law itself. That is, by encouraging voters to vote for judges
based on their outrage over past decisions, campaigns encourage newly
elected judges to abandon precedent that is out of favor with the public.160
To be sure, judicial appointments may be based on like considerations, and
as a result all public input into the judicial process may be destructive of
stare decisis.161 Nevertheless, the frequency and regularity with which
elections are held may make it easier to organize campaigns to change a
body of law than would be the case if one were forced to wait for the
retirement of a life-tenured judge who makes the difference in a particular
issue on an appointed court.
By limiting the topics judicial candidates may discuss, and further
limiting the specificity with which candidates may discuss legal issues, the
Canons limit voters’ opportunities to destabilize courts and the law by
making both subject to the whims of the populace. As a result, a Justice
inclined toward stability would look with favor on speech restrictions. Yet
in White the five Justices who had in prior cases seen danger in the chaos of
public political participation held that the Constitution prohibits states from
requiring stability in judicial elections by limiting certain campaign
159
See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 697 (2001). Thus in California
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000), Justice Scalia wrote for a majority that included the White Court
plus Justices Souter and Breyer, holding unconstitutional the use of the “blanket primary,” an experiment
designed to produce more moderate nominees for office at the cost of taking control away from the party leaders
and giving it to ordinary voters. Similarly, in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), the
White majority plus Justice Breyer allowed Minnesota to ban “fusion” candidacies, which would have supported
the viability of third parties at the potential cost of creating confusion and instability. Finally, Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998), again with the concurrence of the same five
Justices and Justice Breyer, permitted the exclusion of a candidate from a debate who would have added another
perspective but who might have disrupted the order and stability usually prevailing in debates. Based on these
cases, one might have expected Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and possibly Breyer, to have supported restrictions on judicial elections. Yet all except Justice Breyer voted to
strike down the restrictions in White. See also Wendel, supra note 108, at 105-06.
160
See Tillman J. Finley, Judicial Selection in Alaska: Justifications and Proposed Courses of Reform, 20
ALASKA L. REV. 49, 57 (2003); Elizabeth A. Larkin, Judicial Selection Methods: Judicial Independence and
Popular Democracy, 79 DENV. U.L. REV. 65, 78-79 (2001); Thomas R. Phillips, Electoral Accountability and
Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 137, 144 (2003).
161
See Dimino, supra note 98, at 285-86.
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speech.162 Treating White as a case about controlling the chaotic and
confusing aspects of political campaigns therefore fails to explain the
Justices’ positions.
A refined version of the Pildes critique may carry more explanatory
power: Justices and others who support restrictions on judicial politics are
not those who would impose stability on an electoral system because of a
general fear of democratic chaos. Rather, they do so because of a fear of
democracy infecting the judiciary. Thus, Justices’ beliefs about whether
third parties should be tolerated in legislative elections or whether
innovative ballot-counting strategies should be viewed skeptically do not
predict their approaches to questions of judicial politics. It seems some
Justices are quite accepting of chaos and innovation, as long as the courts
are stable, while others are content with a justice system as chaotic as the
political one. If that is true, it still remains to explain why the Justices
would hold such different views. In the following sections I argue that the
justices who want to be removed from democracy are guarding the countermajoritarian policy-making authority they possess when they are
unaccountable.
C. Speech Restrictions Muting Calls for Law and Order
From Richard Nixon’s 1968 campaign pledge to appoint “strict
constructionists” who would counter the revolving-prison-door policy of the
Warren Court to present-day elections for local judicial office,163 the
primary issue in appeals to the public about the judiciary – in particular, the
state judiciary, where the vast majority of criminal cases are tried and
appealed, and where other controversial issues such as abortion and
affirmative action are less frequently litigated – has been criminal justice.
Criminal issues have the advantages of being emotionally gripping,
appealing to voters’ senses of fear, moralism, and outrage, with clear good
guys and bad guys, and of allowing the voters to visualize judges as they are
often portrayed on television – presiding over criminal trials. It is much
tougher to make voters excited about other aspects of a judge’s job.164
And in criminal cases the public is always on the side of law
enforcement, viewing with suspicion judges who release the guilty on
“technicalities” or impose less than maximum sentences:165 “[E]very
162
See James A. Gardner, Forcing States To Be Free: The Emerging Constitutional Guarantee of Radical
Democracy, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1467, 1481-84, 1497 (2003) (arguing that the Court was wrong to force states to
tolerate less-regulated judicial campaigns).
163
See, e.g., In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (disciplining a judicial candidate for
advocating a tough stance on crime); In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003) (same).
164
See Kyle D. Cheek & Anthony Champagne, Partisan Judicial Elections: Lessons from a Bellwether
State, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1357, 1365 (2003) (stating that appeals to criminal justice are often financed by
advocates for tort reform, because crime has more salience for voters).
165
See, e.g., Anthony Champagne, Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 669, 684 (2002)
(“In the sample of television ads examined for this Paper, judicial candidates battled to outdo one another in their
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judge's campaign slogan, in advertisements and on billboards, is some
variation of ‘tough on crime.’ The liberal candidate is the one who
advertises: ‘Tough but fair.’”166 Accordingly, the discussion of issues and
policy in judicial campaigns will disproportionately favor conservatives.
Speech restrictions, then, help liberals by preventing conservatives from
tapping the public’s law-and-order attitude.
To test the hypothesis that Justices view speech restrictions as a way of
encouraging the election of “defense-oriented judges,”167 I compared the
Justices’ votes in White with their relative positions in criminal procedure
decisions. As demonstrated in the following table, the results are quite
striking.168 Each of the dissenting Justices in White is a liberal169 in
criminal procedure cases, voting in favor of the criminal defendant in a
majority of the cases. In contrast, each Justice who voted in the majority in
White is a criminal-procedure conservative, voting in favor of the criminal
defendant in fewer than 30% of the cases.

tough-on
- crime attitudes and their support for and by law enforcement.”); Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some
Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995, 2000 (1995) (“Every judge's campaign slogan, in
advertisements and on billboards, is some variation of ‘tough on crime.’ The liberal candidate is the one who
advertises: ‘Tough but fair.’”); Roy A. Schotland, Campaign Finance in Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1489, 1491 (2001) (“‘Tough on crime’ is surely the most frequent ‘platform’ of more than a few judicial
candidates, whether explicit or only ‘signaled.’”); Abbe Smith, Defense-Oriented Judges, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1483, 1504 (2004) (“[J]udges who enforce the Constitution are vulnerable to an anti-crime constituency
concerned only about the end result of a ruling. . .”); Penny J. White, Legal, Political, and Ethical Hurdles to
Applying International Human Rights Law in the State Courts of the United States (and Arguments for Scaling
Them), 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 959 (2003) (“The politically correct, and astute, judicial platform, has long been ‘tough
on crime.’ Candidates compete to see who can amass the toughest record on crime as a means of securing a seat
on the bench. Judges at every level have found it advantageous to voice their support for capital punishment.”).
See also Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 397-98 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that an elected judge
might be unduly hesitant to disregard a jury’s recommendation of a death sentence); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 475 n.14 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the
Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV.
760, 785 (1995) (“Opponents criticize judges for a lack of cruelty.”).
166
Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995, 2000 (1995).
167
See generally Smith, supra note 165.
168
I compiled this data in the second column using the same search criteria I used to analyze the Justices’
voting patterns in First Amendment cases, see supra note 157, except that here I limited the issues to numbers 13199. The first column is taken from EPSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 156, at 486-89.
169
In this context, a “liberal” decision is one favoring the person accused of a crime. See SPAETH, supra
note 155, at 58.
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The link between the votes in White and the votes in criminal-procedure
cases, and particularly the wide gulf between the most liberal conservative
(Justice O’Connor or Justice Kennedy, with fewer than 30% liberal
criminal-procedure votes) and the most conservative liberal (Justice Souter
or Justice Breyer, with more than 50% liberal votes) suggests a relationship
between a Justice’s views of judicial protection of the rights of the accused
and that Justice’s views of the free-speech rights of judges. Were the
Justices crudely trying to engineer rules of judicial election to support their
criminal-justice philosophies, the Justices may have voted exactly as they
did in White.170
Of course, other issue areas besides criminal procedure demonstrate a
similar breakdown. Federalism cases, for example, show the five Justices
in the White majority as the most conservative.171 But there is no reason to
think that judicial-free-speech cases should be correlated with federalism
cases.172 The reason criminal-procedure cases appear particularly likely to
170
Cf. THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN
JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 246 (2004) (“The Rehnquist Court’s vision of freedom of speech is not a partisan vision
– the Court defends the right of liberals as well as conservatives to speak their mind – but it is clearly a
conservative vision, as the Court has defended this freedom primarily in those contexts in which liberal legislators
have sought to infringe upon it.”); Dimino, supra note 76, at 819 (arguing that certain judicial-selection systems
“represent[] a rigged process to ensure the continued policy influence of elites who cannot justify their decisions
to the electorate”).
171
See EPSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 156, at 486-89.
172
Indeed, one might expect a correlation in the opposite direction. Insofar as conservatives in federalism
promote the authority of state governments over federal power, one might expect conservatives to support stateenacted speech restrictions over an individual’s attempt to invoke the federal Constitution.
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influence votes on judicial free-speech is the established connection
between judicial campaigns and criminal law, specifically in protecting the
power of the judiciary to set free guilty criminals for whom “technicalities”
have not been adequately observed.
It is clear that the connection has not escaped the Justices. Both the
majority and the dissents referred to elections’ potential effects on the
criminal justice system, and the rights of criminal defendants are a
persistent concern in pro-restriction writings, in part due to the preeminent
focus on criminal justice during judicial campaigns. Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion acknowledged the fate likely to befall “the judge who frees
Timothy McVeigh,”173 while Justice Ginsburg repeatedly protested the
ways unregulated campaigns could affect the “due process rights”174 of
litigants “in both civil and criminal cases.”175 Supporters of restrictions
worry that judges who campaign on tough-on-crime platforms could give
“[c]riminal defendants and criminal defense lawyers . . . a genuine concern
that they will not be facing a fair and impartial tribunal.”176
More importantly, perhaps, disciplinary cases charging judicial
candidates with improper campaigning often involve the candidates’
attempts to broadcast a tough-on-crime image. The candidate whose
statements were at issue in White itself criticized the Minnesota Supreme
Court concerning both criminal and non-criminal issues. Post-White
decisions in New York177 and Florida178 both involved candidates who were
sanctioned for advocating a pro-law enforcement “bias.”
A criminal-procedure liberal is far more likely to see the protection of
criminal defendants as a “compelling” interest, and might therefore be more
likely to uphold a speech restriction designed to serve that interest than
would a Justice less inclined to agree with the claims of criminal
defendants. It is entirely possible that a Justice’s views on criminal
procedure might color his or her views about judicial free speech, therefore,
even without directly considering the crass political goal of wanting to elect
judges who agree with the criminal-justice positions of the Justice.179
173

Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782 (2002).
Id. at 813-19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
175
Id. at 813 (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)).
176
Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 89. Compare the attitude reflected in Kinsey with the approach of the Tenth Circuit,
stating that generally a judge who states a desire to punish lawbreakers harshly expresses no “bias” justifying
recusal: "Judges take an oath to uphold the law; they are expected to disfavor its violation." United States v.
Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993).
177
See In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2003) (sanctioning a judicial candidate for stating that tough
judicial decisions were necessary to deter crime in the locality).
178
See In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003) (reprimanding and fining a judicial candidate for arguing that
police officers’ testimony should be taken “seriously” and that criminals should be put behind bars).
179
Data on the state courts that have considered judicial-free-speech issues indicate that a similar
relationship may be present there as well. When the Florida Supreme Court considered In re: Kinsey, Justice
Wells dissented from the court’s imposition of a penalty on Judge Kinsey for her campaign tactics. Justice Wells
was identified as a liberal in Professor Langer’s state-court database, but sided with the prosecution in 90.7% of
criminal cases in the 2002 and 2003 terms, when the court as a whole ruled for the prosecution in only 73.4% of
174
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In recent years, however, as judicial elections have become
opportunities for referenda on the justice system generally, interest groups
have used the courts as means for influencing policy in myriad subject
areas.180 Notably, tort liability181 and the role of religion in society and
government182 have been salient campaign themes. Perhaps liberals can
make use of this new opportunity to take the focus off crime;183 a campaign
focused on equality, diversity, abortion, and protecting the disadvantaged
might play well in areas that lean Democratic but would elect a Republican
to a judgeship if the only available information indicated that the
Republican would keep the community safer.184 Open campaigns might
therefore benefit candidates with different ideologies depending on the
sentiment of the relevant electorate.
Even if liberals can cut into conservatives’ advantages in campaigning,
however, it seems that conservatives do benefit overall from involving the
public in the process of electing judges. After all, the legal community,
including the judiciary, is more liberal than the community as a whole,185
and for that reason it benefits liberals politically to minimize judicial
accountability to the public and to consolidate the power of judicial
selection within the bar.186 Under this analysis, criminal-justice is just a
subset of a larger class of cases: those where the power of the judiciary is
used to benefit a politically unpopular group.
the cases. A list of cases on which this observation is based is on file at the __ Law Review.
180
See, e.g., Polly Simpson & Sally Weaver, Judicial Elections: Pollsters Want to Seat Far-Right
Ideologues, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, July 16, 2004, at A13 (complaining about the Christian
Coalition’s use of questionnaires distributed to judicial candidates as a means of publicizing the candidates’ views
on “such issues as abortion, homosexuality and school prayer”).
181
See generally, e.g., DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004: HOW SPECIAL INTEREST PRESSURE ON OUR COURTS HAS REACHED A “TIPPING
POINT” – AND HOW TO KEEP OUR COURTS FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 24-25, available at
<http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/NewPoliticsReport2004.pdf> (last viewed June 28, 2005); Anthony
Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (2005); David W. Neubauer, Issues in
Judicial Selection, 49 LA. B.J. 45
0, 452 (2002) ; Emily Heller, Judicial Races Get Meaner, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 25,
2004, at 1.
182
See, e.g., GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 181, at 32 (noting the influence of “[t]he politics of social
conservatism” in Alabama); Jim Oliphant, Ruling or Stump Speech?: Anti-Gay Opinion Sparks Debate on
Judicial Elections, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at 1.
183
See Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, supra note 26, at 1414 (noting that “the label
‘Republican’ is perceived as ‘tough on crime,’” giving candidates of that party an advantage in judicial elections
and leading Democrats to propose alternative methods of judicial selection).
184
As a possible example, Max Baer successfully ran for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court campaigning as a
pro-choice, pro-death penalty, anti-tort-reform Democrat. See MacKenzie Carpenter, Should Justice Be Mute as
Well as Blind?: Supreme Court Rivals Disagree on Speaking Out, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 2003, at
A-1.
185
See Amy E. Black & Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill All the Lawyers First?: Insider and Outsider Views
of the Legal Profession, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 835, 842-49 (1998) (reporting that lawyers are socially
more liberal than the general public, though they are moderately conservative on economic issues); Paul Brest,
Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 664-67 (1985) (reporting data found by indicating that members of the
“legal elite” are more civil libertarian than both the public and the “opinion elite”); Stephen L. Carter, Bork Redux,
or How the Tempting of America Led the People to Rise and Battle for Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 759, 769-70
(1991) (book review).
186
See Dimino, supra note 76, at 811 (arguing that moves to limit the involvement of the public in judicial
selection “favor those interest groups and judges who would lose popular votes”).
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D. Majoritarian Perspectives on the Supreme Court
Insofar as speech restrictions are designed to provide judges with the
power to act contrary to the desires of majorities, perhaps the votes in White
can be explained by reference to the Justices’ views of the proper role of
judges in interpreting law, and the place of the judiciary as a countermajoritarian force within a democratic republic. While this claim is related
to the partisan motivations discussed above, I believe there to be important
differences. First, Justices who promote greater public involvement in the
judicial process and fear the excesses of an unaccountable judiciary can be
promoting democracy without regard to the political ramifications of such
public involvement. And although the majoritarian movement in law is
predominantly conservative,187 it is possible that on some issues public
involvement will turn the judiciary to the left, as was the hope of some who
championed the idea of judicial elections in the nineteenth century.188
Second, courts have long been noted as the institution in a position to
protect those individuals who lack access to the political process.189 Thus,
Justices wishing to maintain courts as checks on legislative excess may
desire more judicial isolation not because the judiciary makes better policy
choices, but because it is dangerous to leave the legislature with unchecked
power.190 Thus focusing on judicial power may be a more useful, nuanced
way of analyzing attitudes toward judicial free speech than by merely
looking at a judge’s overall conservatism or liberalism.
Where courts have neither the purse nor the sword, they depend on
public acquiescence for their rulings to have any impact.191 Legitimacy –
specifically, the public willingness to acquiesce in the rulings of courts192 –
enables policy-making, and without it the courts are powerless to stand
between the majority and their desires. The dissenters’ concern with
“legitimacy” and “public confidence” thus reflects a jealous guarding of
judicial power. The empirical data bear out this interpretation: Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer have, with Justice Kennedy, been the
most reliable advocates on the Court for exercising judicial power.193
By “majoritarian” I do not mean simply an unwillingness to strike down
187
See, e.g., BORK, supra note 47, at 117; Graglia, Judicial Review, supra note 47. But see LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); TUSHNET,
supra note 47.
188
See Hall, supra note 26, at 341, 345, 348.
189
See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); ELY, supra note 40.
190
See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities . . . .”).
191
See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2752 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1828 (2005)
(describing “authoritative legitimacy”).
193
See infra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
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laws. Instead, the majoritarian Justice will refrain from striking down those
laws that have majority support from the voters. There are several reasons
“duly enacted laws do not always carry with them popular support.”194
Most obviously, most members of the public are unaware of the existence
of most laws whose constitutionality is at issue in Supreme Court cases.
Fewer still care very much about whether a particular law survives judicial
review.195 A public that is unaware of a law and apathetic about its
continued existence is unlikely to oppose a Court decision striking it down,
and a majoritarian Justice will not feel very conflicted in joining such a
decision.
Furthermore, legislation is often enacted not to placate the majority, but
to appeal to minorities who are particularly concerned about an issue. Thus,
the process of legislative logrolling yields laws that are opposed mildly by
large portions of the public but are actively supported by minorities who use
the intensity of their preferences to influence the legislative process.
Striking down such legislation is hardly counter-majoritarian.
To the extent, however, that one can isolate instances of judicial review
of popular legislation, one might be able to assess which Justices are truly
counter-majoritarian, and therefore which might have the greatest fear of a
popularly influenced judiciary. I attempted to capture this variable by
analyzing the cases that have concerned judicial review of direct
democracy, i.e., initiatives and referenda. In those cases, where the voting
public has already indicated majority support for the measure, a vote to
strike down the law indicates a willingness to oppose the expressed will of
the people. It should, therefore, be a good indicator of a Justice’s countermajoritarian inclinations.196 Unfortunately, there are too few Supreme
Court decisions involving the constitutionality of initiatives or referenda to
be helpful. Since Justice Breyer’s 1994 appointment, there have been only
three such cases.197 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas voted to strike down only one of the three, making them the most
majoritarian Justices on that measure, consistent with the findings in the rest
of this Article, but the number of cases is far too small to enable one to
make meaningful conclusions.
194
Friedman, supra note 30, at 2605. See generally, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST
POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE
(1988).
195
See Devins, supra note 63.
196
This is not to say, however, that initiatives or referenda that become law necessarily represent the
majority’s desires. The public may be ill-informed about or uninterested in the matter, and most may not vote at
all. See Mihui Pak, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty in Focus: Judicial Review of Initiatives, 32 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 237, 245-46 (1999); Michael Vitiello & Andrew J. Glendon, Article III Judges and the Initiative
Process: Are Article III Judges Hopelessly Elitist?, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1275 (1998). Nevertheless, as
compared to republican legislative activity, direct democracy is more majoritarian as a general matter.
197
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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Of potentially equal value are the Justices’ votes in cases raising issues
of judicial power. If, as I have argued, the purpose of speech restrictions is
to increase the power of the judiciary to act against majority preferences,
then those Justices who support judicial power should be inclined to support
the constitutionality of speech restrictions. The following graphs use two
different measures to capture the Justices’ beliefs about judicial power: the
number of cases where a Justice votes to strike down a law as tabulated by
Professor Lori Ringhand using political scientist Harold Spaeth’s Supreme
Court database,198 and my tabulation of the Justices’ votes in “judicial
power” cases as classified in the same database,199 which include cases
adjudicating issues of standing, justicability, jurisdiction, and the like.200
“Pro-judicial-power decisions” are ones which the Justice voted to permit
the court to entertain the action.201
Combined Votes to Strike Down Federal and State Statutes (1994-2004 Terms)
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Source: Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism and the Rehnquist Court 19-20 (Aug. 11, 2005)
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript on file with the _____ Law Review) (reporting data collected from the JusticeCentered Supreme Court Database, available at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm, and
updated
through
the
2004
Term).
Ringhand’s
dataset
is
available
at
<http://uklaw.uky.edu/ringhand/default.aspx>. See also KECK, supra note 170, at 251. Cf. EPSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 156,
at 588-90 (assessing each Justice’s agreement with decisions striking down legislation). Justice Kennedy was the
Justice most likely to agree with the Court when it struck down a law (93.8%)). The other Justices ranked as
follows: Stevens (83.3%), Souter (78.6%), O’Connor (75.7%), Thomas (73.8%), Scalia (69.0%), Ginsburg
(63.6%), Breyer (59.3%), and Rehnquist (44.0%). See id.
199
The methodology for this tabulation was specified in note 157, supra, except that here the issues were
restricted to 701-899.
200
See SPAETH, supra note 155, at 54-56.
201
See id. at 59 (stating that decisions were coded on the basis of whether they were “pro-exercise of judicial
power,” “pro-judicial ‘activism,’” or “pro-judicial review of administrative action”).
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The results show no apparent connection between Justices who voted to
strike down the restriction in White and those who regularly vote to strike
down other laws. The Justices most often voting to strike down a law are
Justices Kennedy, followed by Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Souter (who
votes to strike down sixty-two laws), and Justice Scalia, in that order. Only
two of those five, Justice Stevens and Justice Souter, dissented in White.
Perhaps more important, there is very little variation on this measure
between all of the Justices except Chief Justice Rehnquist,202 suggesting
that measuring their counter-majoritarian tendencies by tallying the number
of votes to strike down statutes does not capture any distinctions in their
jurisprudence.203
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There is, however, some relationship between the Justices’ votes in
White and their votes in cases raising questions of judicial power. Each of
the Justices who have been most supportive of judicial power over the
tenure of the current natural Court (that is, beginning with the appointment
of Justice Breyer) was in the dissent in White. This supports the hypothesis
that because judicial campaign restrictions seek to increase judicial power,
202
Cf. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 78, at 415-16 (noting the relative deference Chief Justice Rehnquist
employs in reviewing both “conservative” and “liberal” statutes, though he is more likely to overturn “liberal
laws”).
203
This is not to say, of course, that the Justices exercise judicial review similarly. The Justices strike down
different kinds of laws, but strike down roughly the same number of laws. See Ringhand, supra note 198.

38

Michael Richard Dimino, Sr.

[9/10/2005

the Justices most accepting of the restrictions will be those who are most
likely to take an expansive view of that power.
Data taking into account all judicial power cases from each Justice’s
appointment through the 2001 Term204 present a similar picture, with the
notable exception of Justice Kennedy’s position. Using that data, Justice
Kennedy is as likely to support claims of judicial power as are Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer. This is not surprising, as Justice Kennedy has earned
a reputation as a “judicial imperialist,”205 being both the Justice most likely
to vote to strike down statutes and the only Justice more likely than not to
vote to strike down statutes206 whether those challenges are from a
conservative of a liberal direction,207 but it does suggest that the Justices’
views on judicial power are not the sole determinant of their positions on
judicial free speech. Such a suggestion is consistent with Justice Kennedy’s
White concurrence. The concurrence rests on the autonomy theory of the
First Amendment, and is likely to indicate that his views of criminal justice
and judicial power may matter less in his analysis of judicial-free-speech
issues than such views may matter for other Justices.
Not only have the Justices’ votes shown differing visions of the role of
courts in society, but the content of their writing has done so as well. The
Justices in the White majority most opposed to exercising judicial power –
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas – have been quite
willing to criticize the counter-majoritarian nature of judicial review as
inconsistent with democratic self-government208 and have encouraged
political oversight of the courts.209 Chief Justice Rehnquist has gone so far
204

See EPSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 156, at 486-89.
David G. Savage, Taking a Road Less Traveled in the High Court: Justice Kennedy, Chosen As a
Conservative, Has Made Decisions That Echo the Liberal Warren Era, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at A33 (quoting
an unidentified “former clerk”).
206
See KECK, supra note 170, at 250.
207
See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 78, at 412-16.
208
See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (opinion of the Court by Rehnquist,
C.J.); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The[] [Framers] left us free to
change. The same cannot be said of this most illiberal Court, which has embarked on a course of inscribing one
after another of the current preferences of the society (and in some cases only the counter-majoritarian preferences
of the society's law-trained elite) into our Basic Law.”); Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Day by day, case by case, the Court is busy designing a Constitution for a country
I do not recognize.”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 470 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“While
overreaching by the Legislative and Executive Branches may result in the sacrifice of individual protections that
the Constitution was designed to secure against the State, judicial overreaching may result in sacrifice of the
equally important right of the people to govern themselves.”); SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE
CONSTITUTION 25-26 (1989); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693,
704-06 (1976). See also Edwin Meese, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L.J. 455, 465 (1986).
209
Chief Justice Rehnquist, having participated in deliberations concerning President Nixon’s nominations
to the Supreme Court, see JOHN W. DEAN: THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON
APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 15-16, 19, 27-28, 155 (2001), later argued that it was
“both normal and desirable” for the President to try to “pack” the courts with judges fitting his (and, by
hypothesis, the people’s) judicial philosophy. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS,
HOW IT IS 236 (1987). See also South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Overrulings of precedent rarely occur without a change in the Court's personnel.”); REHNQUIST, supra, at 319
205
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as to argue that judges who impose their policy judgments under the guise
of constitutional interpretation “either ought to stand for reelection on
occasion, or their terms should expire and they should be allowed to
continue serving only if reappointed by a popularly elected Chief Executive
and confirmed by a popularly elected Senate.”210
Further, the Court’s majoritarians have suggested that the views of the
people on constitutional matters are as likely to be correct as the views of
judges, undercutting the argument that independence is necessary to achieve
a proper interpretation of the Constitution.211 Justice Scalia, the author of
the Court’s opinion in White, is more explicit than any other member of the
Court in charging the judiciary with refusing to be bound by anything other
than its own desires.212 He has given up on the vision of judicial
independence as a tool to protect the rule of law, and favors limiting that
independence as a second-best alternative to giving courts free rein to do
what they may in the name of the law. As the Justice has opined, “I am not
happy about the intrusion of politics into the judicial appointment process.
Frankly, however, I prefer it to the alternative, which is government by
judicial aristocracy.”213
Each characteristic example of Justice Scalia’s conservative-populist
rhetoric, in which he is often joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, stems from an abiding distrust of the judiciary’s capacity as a lawmaking body. Planned Parenthood v. Casey,214 Lee v. Weisman,215 Romer
v. Evans,216 Stenberg v. Carhart,217 Atkins v. Virginia,218 and Lawrence v.
(arguing that the Constitution provides for political input into the composition of Article III courts and the Article
V amendment process because the Framers were “wary of unchecked power in the judiciary as in all other
branches of government”).
Chief Justice Rehnquist has defended judicial independence, going so far as to refer to it as one of the
“crown jewels” of the constitutional structure, William H. Rehnquist, Keynote Address, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 263,
274 (1996), but, in his words, “[t]his simply shows that there is a wrong way and a right way to go about putting a
popular imprint on the federal judiciary.” Id. at 273.
210
Rehnquist, supra note 208, at 698.
211
See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he point
at which life becomes ‘worthless,’ and the point at which the means necessary to preserve it become
‘extraordinary’ or ‘inappropriate,’ are neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of this
Court any better than they are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone
directory.”); REHNQUIST, supra note 209, at 317 (arguing that viewing the Court as “the conscience of the country
. . . has a considerable potential for mischief” when used to place into law the “personal moral judgments” of
“individual judges.”).
212
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1217 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO.
78 (Alexander Hamilton), at 465, 471 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961)). See also County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 60 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court's constitutional jurisprudence . . . alternately creates
rights that the Constitution does not contain and denies rights that it does.”).
213
See Warren Richey, One Justice’s Vision of Role of the Courts, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 16,
2004, at 1.
214
505 U.S. 833, 996-1001 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
215
505 U.S. 577, 636 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216
517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This Court has no business imposing upon all
Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from which the Members of this institution are selected . . .”),
651-53 (arguing that the Court’s decision was an is “an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political will.”).
217
530 U.S. 914, 954-55 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218
536 U.S. 304, 338 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so
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Texas,219 to name a few cases, all contain language not merely critical of the
Court’s conclusions, but critical of the Court’s use of its judicial review
power.220 As such, they indicate that those Justices see judicial power as a
dangerous in the wrong hands, and that the alternative – relatively
unconstrained majoritarianism – may be preferable.221
The majoritarian language in Justice Scalia’s opinions accompanies his
reliance on originalism, which he views as a way of preventing judges from
changing the Constitution to suit their own preferences.
But
majoritarianism – deference to current public majorities – and originalism –
enforcement of the policy decisions of past majorities – are sometimes in
conflict.222 Both, however, reflect a distrust of elite judicial policy-making,
and it would not therefore be surprising to see majoritarian rhetoric in an
originalist argument where the originalist is accusing other judges of
making policy decisions supported neither in the Constitution nor in current
majority preferences.223 It is interesting in this context to note that the
Justices who believe most fervently in a static conception of law are the
ones in White who saw no compelling interest in maintaining the insulation
of the judiciary. One might expect Justices for whom the law is fixed to
relish the ability to apply that fixed constitutional meaning irrespective of
obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its members.”), 348-52.
219
539 U.S. 558, 602-03 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220
See generally KEVIN A. RING, ED., SCALIA DISSENTS: WRITINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S WITTIEST,
MOST OUTSPOKEN JUSTICE (2004); Michael Frost, Justice Scalia’s Rhetoric of Dissent: A Greco-Roman Analysis
of Scalia’s Advocacy in the VMI Case, 91 KY. L.J. 167 (2002).
221
To be sure, there may be alternate explanations for the rhetoric in Justice Scalia’s separate opinions. His
personality, rather than a majoritarian philosophy, may cause the opinions to be more personal than they would
otherwise be. Thus, other Justices’ relatively restrained use of such rhetoric may not indicate that Justice Scalia is
much more majoritarian than they are. Still, it seems important that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, who often
use judicial power in such a way as to evoke the ire of Justice Scalia, typically decline to join Justice Scalia’s
separate opinions when he is his most bombastic in criticizing the Court’s free-wheeling approach to judicial
review, even when they agree with him as to the outcome of the case. Additionally, criticizing the Court is by no
means rare in dissenting opinions, though as I stated in the text, I think the majoritarian rhetoric is subtly different
from run-of-the-mill dissents.
I attempted to measure empirically the degree of anti-Court rhetoric in Supreme Court opinions, but
achieved only inconclusive results. Hypothesizing that the Justices I have identified as most majoritarian would
criticize the Court for disregarding the rule of law, see John C. Eastman, Judicial Review of Unenumerated
Rights: Does Marbury’s Holding Apply in a Post-Warren Court World?, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 713, 740
(2005) (“A ‘Rule of Law’ that is itself lawless is not the kind of ‘law’ that generates (or deserves) respect.”);
Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 985 (1987), and that the counter-majoritarian
Justices would hold out the courts as safeguarding the rule of law, see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 158 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Farnsworth, supra no
te 96, at 170; Randall T. Shepard, Judicial Independence: Telephone Justice,
Pandering, and Judges Who Speak out of School, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 811, 811 (2002), I asked my research
assistant to collect all the decisions in which one or more Supreme Court opinions used the term “rule of law,”
and to categorize the use of the term as pro-court or anti-court. She found twenty-one pro-court uses, and sixteen
anti-court ones. We then tallied the Justices who joined each opinion using the term and calculated the percentage
or each Justice’s uses that were pro-court and anti-court. From most anti-court to most pro-court, the Justices
(with pro-court percentages in parentheses) were: Scalia (50%), Thomas (57%), Souter (64%), Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer (67%), Rehnquist and O’Connor (75%), and Kennedy (100%). A list of the cases on which
this data is based is on file at the ___ Law Review.
222
See generally KECK, supra note 170.
223
See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. __, __, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2752 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for “contradict[ing] both historical fact and current practice”).
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current preferences. Stated differently, Justices who believe that law is
unchanging are counter-majoritarians in that they reject current majority
preferences in favor of law established by prior generations’ majorities.
Yet in spite of originalists’ willingness to oppose current majorities,
they are willing to tolerate public influence on the law to avoid an even
greater harm: judges’ policy preferences, rather than the public’s, shaping
the law’s evolving content. White therefore suggests that originalists see
three possible ways in which adjudication proceeds: (1) Independent courts
apply a fixed conception of law, occasionally in opposition to current
majority preferences. (2) Accountable courts apply an evolving concept of
law, interpreting the law in accordance with public preferences. (3)
Independent courts apply an evolving concept of law, interpreting the law in
accordance with (other) judges’ own preferences. Originalists forsook (1)
in White, either because they viewed it as unrealistic to hope that judges
will faithfully interpret the law without looking to their own policy
preferences or because those areas where originalism still holds sway
(statutory construction and some separation-of-powers issues, for example)
are unlikely to be significant in public discussions of judicial performance.
On issues important to the public – crime, capital punishment, abortion,
affirmative action, gay rights – originalist arguments are overwhelmingly
heard in dissent. It makes sense, therefore, that the originalists would see
the effective choice presented in White as between judicial and majoritarian
policy-making, and that they would prefer the latter.
The White dissenters, on the other hand, have praised courts’ ability to
advance the fortunes of individuals and groups lacking access to the
political process.224 They see courts as agents of change, policy-makers
who can improve on the law, pushing the nation to fulfill aspirations of
equality and liberty, only if they are unconstrained by the unenlightened
public’s desires.225 Justice Ginsburg, for example, accepts moderate,
incremental change in policy, but because moderate change will be
politically acceptable, rather than because moderation is what she desires.226
224

Justice Ginsburg has praised the independence of the federal judiciary because it enables the courts to
stand in the way of majoritarian desires—to protect those who “‘are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they
are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement.’” See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Judicial
Independence, 20 HAW. L. REV. 603, 608-09 (1998) (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)).
225
Justice Breyer has argued against using the First Amendment to promote individual self-expression at the
expense of other values. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399-405 (Breyer, J., concurring);
Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 250-256 (2002). It is therefore not
surprising that he would see fit to allow states to restrict speech to promote counter-majoritarian judicial power.
226
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1208 (1992)
(“[W]ithout taking giant strides and thereby risking a backlash too forceful to contain, the Court, through
constitutional adjudication, can reinforce or signal a green light for a social change.”). Thus, Justice Ginsburg has
criticized the Court’s “breathtaking” decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), because the forceful way in
which the Court articulated the abortion right stalled the legislative process which had been lessening restrictions
on abortion until Roe provoked “a well-organized and vocal right-to-life movement [which] rallied and
succeeded, for a considerable time, in turning the legislative tide in the opposite direction.” Ginsburg, supra, at
1198, 1205.
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This analysis suggests that though visions of judicial power may
motivate most of the Justices’ positions on judicial free speech, it
apparently does not so influence the Justices in the middle – particularly
Justice Kennedy. He holds an expansive conception of judicial power and
has refrained from joining (indeed, he is the object of227) much of the
majoritarian anti-court rhetoric. Moreover, both he and Justice O’Connor
joined with Justice Souter in Casey to write the most self-conscious plea for
legitimacy and power in the Court’s history.228 Thus, the Justices who see
the Canons as limiting the public’s influence over the judiciary may uphold
them or strike them down depending on whether they see that influence as
positive or negative; Justices who see the Canons as limiting the search for
truth and individual self-expression may strike them down regardless of
their views of counter-majoritarian policy-making.
Putting these considerations together, the following hypothesis
develops: Judges are willing to grant First Amendment protection to
political speech by judges if either they view the claim of free speech
through an individual-rights, autonomy-focused paradigm, under which the
government is not permitted to limit the freedoms of speech and thought to
encourage support for the government, or they view speech restrictions as
an undemocratic attempt to enable elite policy-making by the judiciary.
Judges are unwilling to grant First Amendment protection to political
speech by judges if they view that speech as threatening judicial
independence and if for the most part they consider independence beneficial
in protecting the rights of the unpopular.229
III. THE COMPETING INTERESTS
Restrictions on the political activity of judges and judicial candidates
fall into two categories: restrictions on the ways judges conduct their own
campaigns, and restrictions on the involvement of judges in politics
227
See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 955 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is no cause for
anyone who believes in Casey to feel betrayed by this outcome.”), 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“A review of
Casey demonstrates the legitimacy of these policies.”); 979 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s holding stems
from . . . misinterpretation of Casey . . .); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Justice Kennedy’s separate opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part), “of course” were inconsistent with Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Weisman), 636 (referring to Justice Kennedy’s “coercion” analysis as “psychology
practiced by amateurs” and “not to put too fine a point on it, incoherent”).
228
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-69 (1992). See also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958).
229
I do not believe, nor do I claim, that this division will predict every vote. As an example of the
limitations of this analysis, Judge Reinhardt, considered to be one of the most liberal federal appellate judges,
concurred in a decision striking down a law forbidding parties from endorsing candidates in non-partisan races,
including judicial ones. See Geary v. Renne, 911 F. 2d 280 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc). His opinion contained the
traditional First Amendment arguments bespeaking an autonomy approach to the issue, see id. at 286, 289-90
(Reinhardt, J., concurring); see also Stephen Reinhardt, Judicial Speech and the Open Judiciary, 28 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 805 (1995), as did the majority opinion, see 911 F.2d at 283-86 (opinion of the court), but it also contained
reference to the ability of voters to base their votes on the policy positions of judicial candidates, see id. at 294-95
(Reinhardt, J., concurring), a surprising rhetorical move for a liberal.
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generally or in others’ campaigns. The interests served by each type of
restriction are somewhat different, and as a result judicial review of one
type may not indicate whether all restrictions on political activity are
constitutional.
A. Restricting Judicial Campaigns and Limiting Public Influence on
Judicial Policy
In sharp contrast to the distance most federal judges put between
themselves and electoral politics,230 judges in thirty-nine states stand for
some form of popular election,231 and ten of those states elect judges on
partisan ballots.232 As a result, state-court judges often make less of an
effort to separate themselves from politics and parties than do their federal
counterparts,233 and critics charge that the line between law and politics has
been blurred by elections that force judges to become politicians.234 To
stem this concern, state canons of judicial ethics have regulated judicial
campaigning, resulting in contests that typically have been “boring, low
participation, minimally useful affairs.”235
Until the 1990s, state regulation of the political speech of judges largely
went unchallenged, and it was unclear whether judges – even elected judges
230
In recent years, blatantly political remarks by a federal judge are quite rare – so much so that when such
remarks do occur, they make national news. District Judge Alcee Hastings’s numerous comments about the
“racism” of President Reagan and advocacy for the Reverend Jesse Jackson, see Talbot D’Alemberte, Searching
for the Limits of Judicial Free Speech, 61 TULANE L. REV. 611, 611-14 (1987), and Circuit Judge Guido
Calabresi’s recent statements comparing the selection of President George W. Bush in 2000 to the installations of
Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini (all the while purporting not to comment on “what some have said is the
extraordinary record of incompetence of this administration” ) have caused stirs precisely because they are so
aberrant. See Josh Gerstein, Audience Gasps as Judge Likens Election of Bush to Rise of Il Duce: 2nd Circuit’s
Calabresi Also Compares Bush’s Rise to That of Hitler, N.Y. SUN, July 21, 2004, at 1. Calabresi’s “remarks were
met with rousing applause from the hundreds of lawyers and law students in attendance” at the American
Constitution Society event. Id.
231
See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 1, at 209- 11.
232
See id. The ten states are Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia.
233
See, e.g., O’Neill v. Coughlan, No. 1:04CV1612 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2004) (discussing a complaint
against a judge for disclosing his partisan affiliation in campaign advertisements); Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n
on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y.), vacated on abstention grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2812 (2004) (discussing a state judge’s methods of campaigning for himself and
participation in rallys for candidate Bush during the 2000 election controversy in Florida); Sam Skolnik,
Outspoken Justice is Ripe Target for Rivals: Some See Bias in Libertarian Leanings of “The Great Dissenter,”
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 7, 2004, at B1; Judge Withdraws Decision to Block Nader from Ballot,
available at <http://www.thenewmexicochannel.com/politics/3744807/detail.html> (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
New Mexico judge Wendy York, who held that third-party presidential candidate Ralph Nader should be barred
from that state’s ballot, withdrew her opinion and recused herself owing to controversy generated by her being a
financial contributor to the Kerry campaign. She admitted no bias, but withdrew out of a concern that her
decision created the appearance of impropriety. See Judge Withdraws Decision, supra.
234
See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dis-satisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40
AM. L. REV. 729, 748 (1906) (arguing that the involvement of judges with politics diminishes the respect given
them); Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, supra note 26; Katie Whitehead, Loose Lips Sink Ships: The
Implications of a Liberal Policy Restricting Judicial Speech, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 159, 170 (2003) (bemoaning the
injection of “judicial politics” into “the election process”); Politicians in Judges’ Robes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,
2003, at A24.
235
Reynolds Cafferata, Note, A Proposal for an Empirical Interpretation of Canon 5, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1639, 1674 (1992).
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– had any First Amendment right to speak on political matters or otherwise
participate in politics besides simply appearing on the ballot.236 White
changed that by invalidating Minnesota’s crude attempt to prohibit its
judicial candidates from discussing any disputed legal or political issues.237
Far from settling the issue, however, White provoked new debate among
academics, judges, and states about how best to achieve the goals of judicial
independence, accountability, and free speech.238
Even after White, similar restrictions persist, each of which shapes the
scope of permissible debate in judicial elections. Specifically, the ABA
Model Code requires that judicial candidates “not . . . make pledges,
promises or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial
performance of the adjudicative duties of the office”239 or “knowingly
misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position or other fact

236
Though the “announce clause” challenged in White had not been the subject of a Supreme Court case
until 2002, the ABA changed it in 1990 over concerns that it impinged on free speech. See Max Minzner, Gagged
but Not Bound: The Ineffectiveness of the Rules Governing Judicial Campaign Speech, 68 UMKC L. REV. 209,
214 (1999); Cafferata, supra note 235, at 1646-48; Adam R. Long, Note, Keeping Mud off the Bench: The First
Amendment and Regulation of Candidates’ False or Misleading Statements in Judicial Elections, 51 DUKE L.J.
787, 797 (2001). The current version bars judicial campaign “pledges, promises [and] commitments,” but at least
in theory allows some discussion of issues. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
237
See 536 U.S. at 770-74 (describing the breadth of the prohibition).
238
I have been privileged to take part in this dialogue. See Dimino, supra note 26. Other notable
contributions include Alsdorf, supra note 130; Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due
Process and the Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563 (2004); Katherine A. Moerke,
Must More Speech Be the Solution to Harmful Speech?: Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 48 S.D. L. REV. 262 (2003); and Matthew D. Besser, Note, May I Be Recused?: The Tension Between
Judicial Campaign Speech and Recusal After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1197
(2003). See also The Way Forward: Lessons from the National Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and
the First Amendment, 35 IND. L. REV. 649 (2002), as well as the individual contributions to that symposium,
which was held prior to the Court’s decision in White. Missouri quickly changed its ethical Canon to indicate that
although judges have the First Amendment right to announce their views, “[r]ecusal, or other remedial action,
may . . . be required of any judge in cases that involve an issue about which the judge has announced his or her
views. . . .” See In re: Enforcement of Rule 2.03, Canon 5B(1)(c) Campaign Conduct (July 18, 2002), available at
http:// www.osca.state.mo.us/sup/index.nsf. The ABA similarly mandates that judges recuse themselves when
prior statements have committed them or appeared to commit them with respect to an issue in a case. See CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(f) (2003); Matthew J. Medina, Note, The Constitutionality of the 2003
Revisions to Canon 3(E) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1072 (2004).
239
Forty-three states have a limitation prohibiting pledges, promises, commitments, or all three. The states
that appear to have no comparable prohibition are Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
North Carolina, and Virginia. Of those states, only North Carolina elects judges.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i). Some states prohibit their judges and judicial
candidates from making statements that “appear to commit” them, e.g., FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon
7A(3)(d)(ii); Rule of the Supreme Court of Kentucky 4.300, Canon 5B(1)(c); 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 100.5 (A)(4)(d)(ii),
“with respect to cases or controversies that may come before the court[s]” for which they are running. Because the
statements permitted by White might have appeared to commit a judicial candidate, however, that latter
prohibition is almost certainly unconstitutional. As recounted in that case, candidate Gregory Wersal distributed
literature in a 1996 race “criticizing several Minnesota Supreme Court decisions on issues such as crime, welfare,
and abortion.” Id. at 768. One would think that such statements would, at a minimum, appear to commit him not
to extend those decisions.
As the Seventh Circuit has noted, very few controversies are unlikely eventually to come before a court of
general jurisdiction. See Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993). In practice, then,
prohibitions on speech that could be the subject of a case are more universal than would appear on first inspection.
Furthermore, as White noted, nobody paying attention to a judicial election campaign is likely to care about any
issue other than those issues that might appear in a case. See 536 U.S. at 772.
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concerning the candidate or an opponent.”240 Judicial candidates “shall not
personally solicit or accept campaign contributions or personally solicit
publicly stated support,”241 and the candidate’s campaign committee is
limited to soliciting such support only during a specified window
surrounding the election.242 Contributions are limited in amount243 and
must be reported.244 Finally, the catch-all restriction requires candidates to
“maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office and act in a manner
consistent with the impartiality, integrity and independence of the
judiciary[.]”245
The proffered objective of restricting judicial campaign speech is the
promotion of the “independence” and “impartiality” of the judiciary and the
“appearance” of both “independence” and “impartiality.”246 As the White
majority noted, “independence” and “impartiality” in this context turn out to
be the same thing: the isolation of the judiciary from the desires of the
public.247 A judge who knows that his job depends on being acceptable to
the median voter will not be able to decide cases independent of public
opinion.248 And a judge who has discussed legal issues in an attempt to win
votes will be inclined, all other things equal, to act in accordance with
whatever commitments he has made while campaigning.249 He will
therefore not approach every case neutrally; he will be inclined to favor
whatever side offers the argument he supported while running for office.
Only if judicial electioneering is neutered by prohibiting the discussion of
issues can elections coexist with these ideals of “independence” and
“impartiality.”
According to the theory behind judicial campaign speech restrictions, a
judge who cannot campaign based on issues will not pledge himself to one
side of a controversy, and while in office he will be free to exercise
independent judgment, not fearing retaliation at the ballot box, so long as
his challenger is effectively prevented from criticizing his decisions.
Whether in fact impending elections influence judicial decision-making (as
empirical data suggest they do),250 or whether speech restrictions counter
240

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii).
Id., Canon 5C(2).
242
Id.
243
Id. Canon 5C(3).
244
Id., Canon 5C(4).
245
Id., Canon 5A(3).
246
See, e.g., Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002).
247
Id. at 775 n.6.
248
See, e.g., id. at 788-89 (O’Connor, J., concurring); William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial DecisionMaking in Educational Policy Reform Litigation, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1090 (2004).
249
See id. at 800 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250
See Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, State Supreme Courts and Their Environments: Avenues to
General Theories of Judicial Choice, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST
APPROACHES 284 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as
Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in the American States, 23 AM. POLS. Q. 485 (1995); Melinda
Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POLS. 427 (1992); Melinda
241

46

Michael Richard Dimino, Sr.

[9/10/2005

this influence (which is unclear),251 the ethical Canons’ goal is to reduce
public influence on the making of judicial policy.252
The interest in maintaining the appearance of independence and
impartiality refers to the perception of a judge being immune from public
opinion and other factors besides the law, regardless of whether the judge
was actually influenced. This interest is important, it is alleged, because if
society believes that judges are merely politicians, courts will lose
legitimacy and the people will be less inclined to accept judicial decisions
unquestioningly.253 The Canons’ concern with maintaining a stately
judicial image so as to maintain judicial legitimacy and power, though not a
substantial concern in White,254 figures especially prominently in an
analysis of restrictions on judges’ political activity outside their own
campaigns.
B. Restricting Judicial Participation in Non-Judicial Campaigns and
Protecting Public Esteem for the Judiciary
State and federal codes of judicial ethics (as well as the American Bar
Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct) require both elected and
appointed judges to refrain from political activity, including matters relating
to party politics and campaigns for non-judicial public office. These
Canons include requirements that a judge not “act as a leader or hold an
office in a political organization,”255 “publicly endorse or publicly oppose
another candidate for public office,”256 “make speeches on behalf of a
political organization,”257 “attend political gatherings,”258 or “solicit funds
for, pay an assessment to or make a contribution to a political organization
Gann Hall & Paul Brace, Toward an Integrated Model of Judicial Voting Behavior, 20 AM. POLS. Q. 147 (1992);
Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1980 (1988). But see Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional
Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213,
230-31 (1983) (suggesting that judicial elections are unlikely to influence judges).
251
See Richard L. Hasen, "High Court Wrongly Elected": A Public Choice Model of Judging and Its
Implications for the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1305, 1326, 1335 (1997) (noting that because the public
rarely can use elections to make judges accountable for unpopular decisions, judges are free to “vote their values,
that is, act independently, most of the time, whether they are elected or appointed.”) Cf. Larry T. Aspin &
William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306, 313 (1994) (suggesting that
judges adjust their behavior in fear of electoral defeat even if defeat is “highly unlikely”).
252
It is for that reason that White saw the announce clause as presenting an “obvious tension” with a system
of judicial elections. 536 U.S. at 787; see also id. at 792 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
253
See supra notes 30-33, 42-45
, 191 -92 and accompanying text.
254
White acknowledged that one purported interest served by the announce clause was “preserving the
appearance of the impartiality of the state judiciary,” which was claimed to be compelling because “it preserves
public confidence in the judiciary.” 536 U.S. at 775. The Court held that the clause was not narrowly tailored to
serve any compelling interest in “impartiality,” and that protecting the appearance of a non-compelling goal was
itself non-compelling. The Court did not explicitly consider whether maintaining public confidence could be a
compelling interest apart from a connection to an ill-defined sense of “impartiality.”
255
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5A(1)(a).
256
Id., Canon 5A(1)(b).
257
Id., Canon 5A(1)(c).
258
Id., Canon 5A(1)(d).

12:00 PM

Judges’ Political Speech

47

or candidate.”259 Furthermore, “[a] judge shall resign from judicial office
upon becoming a candidate for a non-judicial office either in a primary or in
a general election,”260 and may not engage in any political activity not
expressly authorized by the Canons or law.261
Whereas restrictions on judicial campaigns seek to “undermin[e] . . .
judicial elections,”262 by limiting voters’ ability to influence judicial policy
through elections, the principal object of restrictions on judges’
participation in others campaigns is different. A judge who wishes to
participate in politics is not susceptible to the same pressures as is a wouldbe judge seeking election. In judicial campaigns, free speech threatens to
make judges servants of the majority. In non-judicial ones, the judge
already has his job, and he seeks no public approval for his political
involvement; he seeks only to persuade his fellow voters and provide
support for his personal or ideological allies.
Accordingly, non-judicial campaign restrictions do almost nothing to
protect judges from public influence.263 Instead, they attempt to maintain
public esteem for the courts by separating them from the dirty business of
politics. Statements by judges that might lead the public to question the
non-political nature of the judiciary are condemned; privately expressed
sentiment in support or opposition to a politician is not. Holding a party
leadership position is prohibited; being a member of a party is not.
Endorsing a candidate for executive or legislative office is prohibited;
voting for that candidate is not. Each of these restrictions is constitutional
only if it is a compelling interest to make the public believe (falsely) that
the judiciary is non-political.264 Particularly after White demonstrated a
willingness to look realistically at the judiciary and see the human element
to judging, such an interest would appear anything but compelling.
The theory behind the Canons is one of appearances: The legitimacy of
courts depends on public respect for judges;265 judicial power depends on
legitimacy;266 and justice often depends on courts having the power to make
259

Id., Canon 5A(1)(e).
Id., Canon 5A(2). See Morial v. Judiciary Comm’n, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (upholding
the Louisiana version of this provision).
261
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5D.
262
White, 536 U.S. at 782.
263
See In re: Farrell, 2004 Annual Report __ (N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct June 24, 2004) (Emery, C.,
concurring) (“If safeguarding impartiality really is the goal, then there cannot possibly be any principled basis for
prohibiting judges from contributing to or campaigning on behalf of others, but allowing them to raise money in
this manner and campaign for themselves.”).
264
Cf. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Norms, Dragons, and Stare Decisis: A Response, 40 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 1064, 1080 (1996).
265
See Nancy Gertner, To Speak or Not to Speak: Musings on Judicial Silence, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1147,
1149, 1152 (2004).
266
See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 43, at 239-40. Indeed, judicial power is synonymous with the sense of
“legitimacy” that I use in this Article, viz., the extent to which the public acquiesces in a decision it views as
wrong. Professor Fallon has termed this “authoritative legitimacy,” and sees it as a subset of “sociological
legitimacy,” which is concerned with public obedience to judicial decisions, rather than any more normative
260
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unpopular rulings.267 If judges lose their neutrality by becoming part of the
political machinery that is the antithesis of law, public respect for judicial
decisions will diminish (we are warned),268 and the judiciary will lose its
power to enforce law when that law is unpopular.269
Left unspecified, however, are the specific consequences feared by
proponents of the restrictions. A range of public responses to an
“illegitimate” judiciary is possible, from open defiance of court decisions to
the election of leaders determined to set the courts on a different path,270 but
in any event the capacity of courts to be policy-makers will be reduced if
the public loses respect for judges. Pro-restriction forces benefit from
leaving ambiguous exactly what they fear might happen if judges spoke
their minds about politics. It may very well be a compelling interest to
protect the power of courts to issue decisions and have decrees obeyed.
Thus quotes about the importance of the judiciary sometimes suggest that
the very survival of the separation of powers is at stake.271 But such an
vision of legitimacy under which the important question is whether the decision is in some sense “right.” See
Fallon, supra note 192, at 1827-33.
267
See, e.g., Raab, 793 N.E.2d at 1290-93; Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality
and the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 611 (2002) (arguing that the appearance of
favoritism can undermine public confidence in the judiciary); Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Preserving Judicial
Independence – An Exegesis, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 835, 839 (2002) (citing the importance of public respect for
the law).
268
Interestingly, there is no evidence that public acquiescence in judicial decisions depends on a perception
that judges hold no political views. See Mark Kozlowski, Should the Regulation of Judicial Candidate Speech
Regarding Legal and Political Issues Be Reconsidered?, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 161, 172 (2001); Snyder, supra note
43, at 241-43; Wendel, supra note 108, at 85. There is, however, evidence that judicial decisions are more likely
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(D.C. Cir. 1987)); Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 529-32 (6th Cir. 1998) (discounting statistical evidence that a
majority of the public viewed limits on judicial campaign spending as beneficial in reducing contributors’
influence); Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When Public
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(2002).
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apocalyptic vision is unlikely to materialize. In spite of the judiciary’s
extremely limited capacity to force compliance with its decisions,
compliance is what it receives. And even after such controversial decisions
as Bush v. Gore,272 public respect for the Court is reasonably high.273 It is
therefore difficult to see how squelching judicial speech is narrowly tailored
to protect the power of the judiciary to enforce its decisions.
If judicial legitimacy is compromised by actions short of outright
disobedience, however, then speech restrictions begin to serve that end
more directly. Judicial legitimacy might be threatened whenever the public
seeks to challenge judicial authority, even bylawful means. That is, a
public movement to use the political process to reverse a trend of court
decisions is subversive of judicial power, perhaps as much so as a refusal to
abide by a court order. When legitimacy is used in this way, the elections
of Franklin Roosevelt, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan, and the ouster
of California Chief Justice Rose Bird and two of her colleagues damaged
the “legitimacy” of the United States and California Supreme Courts by
making it more difficult for those courts to enact policy as they had prior to
the elections. Perhaps limitations on judges’ political speech seek to
enhance judicial legitimacy not in the sense of inducing the public to
comply with court orders, but of making it difficult to challenge courts’
counter-majoritarian policy-making role.
Speech restrictions, insofar as they encourage the public to envision
judges as non-political, may well have the effect of discouraging the public
from seeking to alter judicial policy through politics (though I am aware of
no data on the issue). Even if there is a narrowly tailored relationship there,
however, there remains the compelling interest requirement. It is one thing
to claim a compelling interest in enforcing court decisions; it is quite
another to claim a compelling interest in protecting the judiciary as an
unaccountable policy-maker. If, indeed, the restrictions on judges’ speech
are in place to sustain the policy-making power of the judiciary, they would
seem to be unconstitutional.
Restrictions on judicial participation in non-judicial politics are also
justified by a concern for protecting impartiality: Judges should not be so
connected to a party or candidate that they cannot fairly adjudicate a dispute
involving that party, candidate, or an opponent of either. One need not
Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 5-6 (2003); Gerald E. Rosen, Judicial Independence in an Age of
Political and Media Scrutiny, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 685, 690 (1997); Shepard, supra note 221. Chief Justice
Shepard goes so far as to claim that reviewing judges’ philosophies when considering them for promotion is a
“stealthy form of telephone justice.” Shepard, supra note 221, at 817. See also Scheppele, supra note 40 (arguing
that judicial independence is compromised both by “telephone justice” and by rules of law that constrain judicial
discretion).
272
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
273
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Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 535, 535, 555 (2003).
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quarrel with the contention that establishing or maintaining this kind of
judicial impartiality is a compelling state interest.274 Indeed, public
tolerance of judicial review depends on judges being able to dispense justice
according to law, irrespective of the political influence of the parties or any
personal connection between the judge and a party to a case before him.275
Similarly, restrictions on judicial support (financial and otherwise) for
political candidates serve two interests related to this concern about
impartiality: First, they ensure that parties and officials not extort political
support from judges in return for party nominations and the like. Second,
by prohibiting campaign contributions by judges they ensure that the public
will not perceive nominations for judicial office as being for sale.276
In practical application, however, restrictions on judicial political
activity serve the goal of impartiality quite indirectly, if at all. Prohibiting a
judge from making contributions does nothing to ensure that a judge’s
initial nomination was not the result of contributions made in years past as a
private citizen.277 And parties should seek to be faithful to long-term
supporters by providing them nominations and electoral support. Parties
may justifiably believe that long-term supporters are more likely to bring
the ideals of the party to the bench than is someone who has never worked
on the party’s behalf. Additionally, there is a ready remedy for concerns of
party abuse of the nomination process that does not limit political speech –
hold nonpartisan elections, where candidates need not seek the approval of
the party leadership to earn a spot on the ballot. Granted, party
endorsement may be important even in a nonpartisan general election,278 but
the interest in limiting party influence on an election is far less important
than limiting the power of parties to be gatekeepers, controlling access to
the ballot on the basis of contributions.
Furthermore, if a judge must recuse himself whenever his impartiality
“might reasonably be questioned,”279 then there is little risk of a biased
decision resulting from a judge’s politicking; a judge will recuse himself
whenever his support for a candidate or party makes him unable fairly to
274
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in judgment) (“There could hardly be a higher governmental interest than a State's interest in the quality of its
judiciary.”).
275
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evaluate a lawsuit.280 Perhaps there is an interest in ensuring that each
judge is eligible to hear the potentially numerous cases involving a public
official in the jurisdiction, but stopping a judge from communicating
publicly his support for a candidate or party hardly advances that interest.281
Because most judges can be assumed to have parties and candidates they
support,282 if we infer bias whenever a litigant is connected to a party or
candidate supported or opposed by the judge, then no judge would be
qualified to rule on any case involving the government.283 Even under the
ABA Canons, political agreement or disagreement with a public official is
not enough to raise even a question of bias unless the public is informed of
that agreement or disagreement. Accordingly, the interest served by
preventing judges from announcing their political positions is not
eliminating bias, but merely convincing the public that no “bias” exists so
as to maintain judicial legitimacy and power.
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Republican Party v. White, a
speech restriction’s underinclusivity raises an inference that the purported
rationales for the restriction are not in fact the actual motivations.284 Here,
the Canons fail to restrict much conduct – such as attendance at fundraisers,
private campaign fundraising through committees, associations with interest
groups,285 and campaigning generally286 – that damages “impartiality” and
“independence” as much as does the conduct that is restricted.287 Thus, one
is left with the conclusion that the Canons are concerned more with public
appearances than with substance,288 and the only reasons for a concern with
appearance are judicial vanity and power.
The restrictions help ensure that “public confidence” in the judiciary not
be diminished, for without a public willing to accept judicial decisions, the
280
See See Republican Party v. White, No. 99-4021, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15864, at *35-*37 (8th Cir.
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Government plane.”).
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power of the courts is lost.289 If judges are considered by the public to be
merely one species of politician, then there is little reason for the public to
accept the lawmaking of the least-representative, least-accountable branch
of government.290 Accordingly, the Canons seek to maintain and increase
judicial power by making the courts appear different from the politicians in
the other branches. And one way of accomplishing this is by removing
judges from politics – or appearing to do so.
Though judicial legitimacy served is important, the regulations forbid
judges’ voluntary participation in the political process – a cost of the
highest constitutional magnitude.291 They have less of an impact on voters
than do restrictions on judicial campaigns, but their effect on the judges
themselves is more severe.292 As Judge Jon Blue explained, “[p]eriodic
campaigns for judicial office . . . occupy only a small portion of an
incumbent judge’s life. . . . But canonical ‘political activity’ restrictions
intrude, in one way or another, upon the lives of incumbent judges on
almost a daily basis.”293 Only the counter-majoritarian Justices will likely
view the interest in judicial legitimacy as sufficiently compelling to allow
states to force their judges to bear the cost of that intrusion.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF WHITE FOR RESTRICTIONS ON
JUDICIAL SPEECH IN NON-JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS
What Republican Party v. White means for the future of judicial free
speech, particularly regarding Canons that restrict judicial participation in
non-judicial campaigns, will be determined by cases that will be heard by a
Court with a different membership than the Rehnquist Court of 2002.
Whether White foretells the invalidation of a great many restrictions on
judicial politics depends on which philosophy the Court chooses to employ
in those future cases. Four alternatives are possible:
First, majoritarians, represented by Justice Scalia’s opinion of the Court,
289
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might object to the idealistic vision of courts encouraged by the restrictions
because that respect enables the policy-making that majoritarians oppose.
Even though voters’ rights to control judicially made policy are not directly
at issue, as they were in White, the Court might conclude that the public
should not be made to surrender policy-making authority under the belief
that judges are apolitical.
Second, the Justices who saw the announce clause as constitutional and
necessary to the enforcement of unpopular laws will continue to support
restrictions even when they limit speech in non-judicial campaigns, because
they believe those restrictions, too, seek to increase the legitimacy of the
judiciary and therefore its power to render counter-majoritarian decisions.
Majoritarian Justices are unlikely to find such an interest compelling, but
counter-majoritarians are.
Third, the Court might attempt to draw the line at loosening restrictions
only for judicial campaigns, reasoning that limits on political speech of
sitting judges do not impact voters to the extent that limits on campaign
speech do. While this approach would be consistent with the portions of
White that stressed the importance of making judges accountable to the
voters, it would ignore the realism that motivated White’s concern with outof-control courts. The instrumental argument for judicial free speech is
powerful not only because judges can act as “representative” policy-makers,
affecting policy consistent with constituents’ desires, but because judges’
own ideological views influence their behavior on the bench. White
encouraged campaign speech so voters could choose the candidate whose
views most matched theirs.294 Accordingly, squelching speech to promote
the idea that judges lack political views ignores White’s attempt to point out
the obvious: The public already knows that judges have political views,
even in states (or the federal system295) where judges are appointed. The
genie is out of the bottle, brushing his teeth with toothpaste that is out of the
tube, riding a horse that has walked through an open barn door, and playing
with a cat that is out of the bag.296
Fourth, Justices who adopt the approach of Justice Kennedy would be
willing to protect political speech, even by judges, because of the expressive
benefit it provides to the speaker and his audience rather than because of the
effect the Canons will have on judicial policy. For them, restrictions on
judges’ political involvement are, by and large, unconstitutional, because
they rest on a rationale insupportable in a regime of popular sovereignty –
that core political speech and association can be limited so the people do not
question part of the government.297 Though Justice Kennedy’s approach
294
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might be thought to be a standard application of First Amendment
principles298 – after all, Minnesota suppressed speech in an election
campaign to immunize elite, undemocratic policy-makers from criticism
and electoral defeat – all eight other Justices rejected that view at least for
the time being, with four contending that judicial speech was in a different
category altogether and four others leaving open the possibility that judicial
campaign speech should be given less freedom than other types of speech.
We should not be surprised that restrictions on speech have political
consequences;299 indeed, historically that has often been the point of
restricting speech and has been one of the reasons the Supreme Court in the
last ninety years has protected it.300 Neither should we be surprised that a
Court that has involved itself in an unprecedented number of political
disputes301 would perceive a First Amendment challenge to campaign
speech as a case about political power. And where the political power at
issue belongs to the courts, we should not be surprised that the battle is
joined between those who want to give the courts enough power to force
others to abide by the law and those who want to give others enough power
to force the courts to abide by it.
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